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INTRODUCTION
In The Path of the Law, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. described the
legal profession as a study in prediction: people pay lawyers to argue
and advise as to the circumstances under which courts will command
the power of the state for or against the clients’ interests.1 For
1. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 457 (1897).
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government contract lawyers, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit has the final word (in cases prosecuted that far) in all
but a vanishing number of the thousands of bid protests and claims
presented each year to procuring agencies, the U.S. Government
Accountability Office (GAO), the U.S. Court of Federal Claims, and
other administrative and adjudicative bodies.2
Perhaps the most striking aspect of the thirteen precedential
Federal Circuit decisions discussed in this Article concerns the
unpredictability, at the time of initial filing, of the journeys upon
which these cases were embarking. A significant number of the
tortuous and splintered histories of the cases discussed in this
Article—as to forum, jurisdiction, and the merits—likely reflect the
selection bias which predicts that the closest cases with the most
uncertain outcomes are the ones most likely to be litigated to the
fullest extent possible.3
Drawing from Holmes, through the
application of the Federal Circuit’s most recent “prophecies of the
past,”4 we may become more accurate handicappers and better
advocates of our clients’ disputes, and thereby better advise when to
say “Enough!” or “More!” in negotiations or as to contemplated
additional legal process.
I.

JURISDICTION

If it is true that we long for clarity but find uncertainty fascinating,5
the lawyers litigating the four precedential jurisdictional cases in the
2013 Federal Circuit government contracts corpus enjoyed an
enthralling trip to these decisions.6 Consider the following.

2. Joseph R. Re, Brief Overview of the Jurisdiction of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit Under § 1295(A)(1), 11 FED. CIR. B.J. 651, 653–54 (2002) (explaining
that Congress granted the Federal Circuit jurisdiction over government contract
claims previously heard in the appellate division of the Court of Claims).
3. See George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1, 17 (1984) (explaining that settlement is most likely in “powerful” cases
where the plaintiff and defendant are in general agreement about the outcome but that
“[s]ettlement negotiations will most often fail . . . where the dispute is most problematic”).
4. Holmes, supra note 1, at 457.
5. CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 97 (Michael Howard & Peter Paret eds. &
trans., 1993 ed.) (“Although our intellect always longs for clarity and certainty, our
nature often finds uncertainty fascinating.”).
6. Our categorization of the cases—jurisdiction, bid protests, claims, and
contractual and statutory interpretation—is, of course, non-exclusive. Our labeling
of four decisions as “jurisdiction” cases, for example, does not imply that the cases
labeled otherwise did not involve jurisdictional issues, and, of course, the
“jurisdiction” cases arose in the context of claims. Our categorization was based on a
judgment concerning the most significant instruction passed by the Federal Circuit
in each case.
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U.S. Marine, Inc. (“USM”) thought it had properly asserted a tort
claim against the U.S. Navy for sharing, without permission, its
proprietary boat design with another contractor.7 Tort claims against
the government must be filed in federal district court, and the
Federal Circuit left little doubt that it agreed with the contractor.8
But because a split U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
previously had ruled that USM essentially had a breach of contract
claim that belonged exclusively in the Court of Federal Claims (a
decision the Federal Circuit had no power to overrule), rather than
leave a legitimate claimant without a forum, the Federal Circuit
demurred, and held that USM could proceed on a contract theory in
the Court of Federal Claims.9
Sharp Electronics (“Sharp”) and its government adversary agreed
that Sharp properly submitted its claim regarding a delivery order
from a General Services Administration (GSA) schedule contract to
the ordering agency contracting officer.10 Imagine the lawyers’
surprise when the contract appeals board sua sponte found that it
lacked jurisdiction because, under the Contract Disputes Act,11 Sharp
Electronics should have instead brought the claim to the GSA
schedule contracting officer.12 After the parties’ jurisdictional
assumption was upended, they certainly faced “fascinating
uncertainty” on the question before the Federal Circuit.13
When Marvin Brandt and the government filed cross suits to
determine who held the reversionary interest in an abandoned
railroad right-of-way, and, if the government owned the property
interest, whether and how much compensation the government owed
Brandt, little could the parties have known how much new law their
case, eventually fractured, would produce. After eight years of
litigation, Brandt’s case gave rise to new procedural law when, after
Brandt lost the reversionary interest issue in the trial court, the
Federal Circuit allowed Brandt to refile the compensation question in
the Court of Federal Claims before he appealed the property interest
issue to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.14 In March
7. U.S. Marine, Inc. v. United States, 722 F.3d 1360, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
8. Id. at 1374.
9. Id.
10. Sharp Elecs. Corp. v. McHugh, 707 F.3d 1367, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
11. 41 U.S.C. §§ 7101–7109 (2012) (formerly codified at 41 U.S.C. §§ 601–613 (2006)).
12. Sharp, 707 F.3d at 1377.
13. See id. at 1378 (Plager, J., dissenting) (noting the “uncertainty” created by
FAR 8.406-6 as to the scope of a Contracting Officer’s authority); see also VON
CLAUSEWITZ, supra note 5 at 97.
14. Brandt v. United States, 710 F.3d 1369, 1371–72 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
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2014, however, the Supreme Court rendered the compensation
question moot when it held that the reversionary interest vested in
Brandt, not the government.15
Last, in the spirit of the “Best Song of 2013,” Northrop Grumman
Computing Systems (“Northrop”) “Got Lucky”16 when the Federal
The court
Circuit reversed the Court of Federal Claims.17
determined that even though Northrop thought it was asserting a
pass-through claim without naming its assignee, Northrop in fact
properly had submitted the claim without mentioning the assignee,
thereby preserving jurisdiction, because the assignment was invalid.18
Because Northrop filed its claim in 2006, if the Federal Circuit had
not concluded that there was jurisdiction, Northrop could have been
time barred from re-filing the claim.19
A. United States Marine, Inc. v. United States
The doctrine of sovereign immunity bars suit against the federal
government, subject only to congressional consent and the
conditions Congress places on allowable suits.20 The Federal Tort
Claims Act (FTCA) waives the federal government’s sovereign
immunity as to tort suits that arise under state law, and it grants
exclusive jurisdiction over such actions to the federal district courts.21
The Tucker Act likewise waives the government’s immunity as to
contract claims and grants exclusive jurisdiction to the Court of
Federal Claims.22 Which court, then, has jurisdiction in the hybrid
situation where the government, by contract, promised not to divulge
a contractor’s trade secrets, but did so anyway? Is this an everyday
15. See Marvin M. Brandt Revocable Trust v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1257, 1268
(2014) (concluding that, in accordance with “basic common law principles,” when
the railroad company abandoned its right of way, the easement terminated, thereby
conferring Brandt full rights and use of the land).
16. In a poll of music critics, Rolling Stone Magazine named Get Lucky by Daft
Punk featuring Pharrell and Nile Rodgers the consensus Best Song of 2013. See 100
Best Songs of 2013, ROLLING STONE, http://www.rollingstone.com/music/lists/100-best
-songs-of-2013-20131204/daft-punk-feat-pharrell-and-nile-rodgers-get-lucky-19691231
(last visited May 12, 2014).
17. Northrop Grumman Computing Sys., Inc. v. United States, 709 F.3d 1107,
1113 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
18. Id. (holding that Northrop did not assert a pass-through claim because the
assignment was invalid under the Anti-Assignment Act).
19. See Contract Disputes Act, 41 U.S.C. § 7103(a)(4)(A) (2012) (requiring
contractor claims to be submitted within six years of claim accrual).
20. See generally Block v. North Dakota ex rel. Bd. of Univ. & Sch. Lands, 461 U.S.
273, 280 (1983) (“The States of the Union, like all other entities, are barred by
federal sovereign immunity from suing the United States in the absence of an
express waiver of this immunity by Congress.”).
21. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1).
22. Id. § 1491(a)(1).
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trade secret misappropriation tort committed to the district courts, or
is it breach of contract action that only the Court of Federal Claims
may hear?
In United States Marine, Inc. v. United States,23 the Federal Circuit
suggested that if it had addressed the issue as an initial matter, it may
have determined that the contractor primarily alleged a claim for
trade-secret misappropriation under state tort law that properly
belonged in federal district court, where it was filed.24 But, the Fifth
Circuit previously had held that the contractor’s claim was based on
an alleged government violation of the limited rights to the
technology it was granted by contract, so it transferred the case to the
Court of Federal Claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1631.25 In these
circumstances, the Federal Circuit applied the “law of the case”
doctrine to find Tucker Act jurisdiction in the Court of Federal
Claims, thereby pragmatically elevating the claimant’s entitlement to
a judicial forum over a more rigid view that would have left a
wronged contractor without a remedy.26
The unusual procedural posture of the case cautions future
litigants against relying on the Federal Circuit’s decision to support
Tucker Act jurisdiction in potentially hybrid tort/breach claims cases
initially filed in the Court of Federal Claims.27 Indeed, the principal
lesson from this case may be one of judicial comity, as the coordinate
Circuit Courts of Appeal worked together to give the claimant access
to a meaningful remedy, while honoring the Court of Federal
Claims’s and the Federal Circuit’s roles and expertise in matters that
pertain to government contracts.
1.

Background
In 1993, USM designed and built a prototype special-operations
boat for the U.S. Navy, “the Mark V.”28 In seeking development
contracts that would leverage its initial design, USM submitted
technical drawings of the Mark V subject to certain limitations,
including the “limited rights” in technical data of the Defense

23. 722 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
24. Id. at 1365–66.
25. Id. at 1362.
26. See id. at 1372–73.
27. Id. at 1362 (“Given the decision of the transfer question in this case by the
Fifth Circuit, we do not decide the [FTCA versus Tucker Act] question afresh. We
ask only whether the Fifth Circuit decision was clearly in error.”).
28. Id.
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Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS).29 USM’s
subsequent contracts included its drawings stamped with the
“Limited Rights Legend” and incorporated the DFARS’s protection
of USM’s rights in its technical data.30 After USM built twenty-four
Mark Vs, the Navy in 2004 sought design improvements for the craft,
and, without disclosing to USM, provided USM’s Mark V designs to
other firms.31
USM brought an FTCA-based claim against the government in the
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, alleging
misappropriation of trade secrets under the applicable Virginia
statute.32 The government moved to dismiss, arguing that USM could
only sue in the Court of Federal Claims pursuant to the Tucker Act
because the parties’ rights with respect to the Mark V were governed
by a contract.33 When the district court denied the motion, the
government did not request a transfer to the Court of Federal
Claims.34 Ultimately, the Eastern District of Louisiana found the
government liable for misappropriation, and, concluding that USM
was entitled to a reasonable royalty for the use of its technology by its
competitor, awarded USM $1.45 million.35
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit vacated the judgment and remanded
the case to the district court with instructions to transfer it to the
Court of Federal Claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1631.36 The appeals court
held that the contract’s limited rights provision provided the
“essential basis” for USM’s claim, and that the Navy’s potential
liability, if any, depended on its contractual non-disclosure
obligations.37 In the Fifth Circuit’s view, the trial court would have to
determine the scope of the contract’s limited rights provisions, a task

29. Id. USM’s reserved rights included what is now the clause at FAR 252.2277013(a)(14) (2013), which states:
Limited rights means the rights to use, modify, reproduce, release, perform,
display, or disclose technical data, in whole or in part, within the
Government. The Government may not, without the written permission of
the party asserting limited rights, release or disclose the technical data
outside the Government, use the technical data for manufacture, or
authorize the technical data to be used by another party . . . .
Id.
30. U.S. Marine, 722 F.3d at 1362.
31. Id. at 1362–63.
32. Id. at 1363.
33. Id.
34. See id. (noting that “the mere existence of potential non-FTCA claims did not
eliminate the district court’s jurisdiction over the FTCA claim that USM actually
asserted”).
35. Id. at 1364.
36. Id.
37. Id.
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of federal contract interpretation that the Tucker Act forbids district
courts from undertaking.38
2.

Jurisdiction in the Federal Circuit
The Federal Circuit had immediate jurisdiction over USM’s appeal of
the district court’s transfer order pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(d)(4)(A).39 Noting that the order would be correct only if both
the district court lacked jurisdiction over USM’s action and if the Court
of Federal Claims had jurisdiction, the Federal Circuit adopted a pathdependent view of the case, where the jurisdictional statute with which
one started the analysis largely determined the outcome.40
If one started with the FTCA, the Federal Circuit reasoned that the
transfer would be “hard to support” under either of the required
predicates for an effective transfer.41 All parties agreed, and the Fifth
Circuit recognized, that misappropriation of a trade secret is a tort
under the relevant state law, and that Congress vested exclusive
jurisdiction over such claims in the district courts; therefore,
Congress barred the Court of Federal Claims from adjudicating
disputes pled as torts.42 Thus, in an FTCA-centric view, the district
court, but not the Court of Federal Claims, would have jurisdiction
over USM’s claims.
If, on the other hand, one began with the Tucker Act, as the Fifth
Circuit had, the Federal Circuit reasoned that the issue becomes
whether the dispute falls within that statute’s commitment of
jurisdiction to the Court of Federal Claims.43 From the vantage that
first looks to the limited rights USM granted to the Navy versus those
it retained, the Federal Circuit determined that the Fifth Circuit was
justified in its view that the Court of Federal Claims was the proper
forum.44 In reaching this conclusion, the Federal Circuit recounted a
long line of cases from other Circuits that acknowledged the
38. USM in fact was a subcontractor to VT Halter Marine, Inc., and did not
contract directly with the U.S. Navy on the Mark V. Despite the lack of privity of
contract between USM and the Navy, however, the Federal Circuit concluded that
USM’s right to a breach remedy upon proof had been established “as a matter of
binding precedent and judicial estoppel” because the Federal Circuit partially relied
on the government’s argument in the district court that USM’s claims could be
heard in the Court of Federal Claims. Id. at 1373. As such, the case does not
establish that in the normal course subcontractors may challenge the government’s
use of trade secrets in breach of contract actions under the Tucker Act.
39. Id. at 1365.
40. See id. at 1365–66 (contrasting the FTCA with the Tucker Act).
41. Id. at 1365.
42. Id. at 1365–66.
43. Id. at 1368.
44. Id.
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substantial overlap between contract and tort claims in cases brought
against the federal government.45 Just like the Fifth Circuit’s decision
here, these cases honored the policy of uniform interpretation of
government contracts that animates the Tucker Act by transferring
the cases to the Court of Federal Claims.46
Refusing to state what its conclusion would have been had it been
analyzing “the interaction of the FTCA and Tucker Act schemes” on a
direct appeal from the Court of Federal Claims, the Federal Circuit
observed that the circumstances of each case will determine which
“regime is the one that takes precedence.”47 Relying on the “law of
the case doctrine,” the Federal Circuit noted that unless it
determined the Fifth Circuit’s judgment was implausible or “clearly
erroneous,” then it must affirm the transfer order.48 Given this
deferential standard, the Federal Circuit affirmed the Fifth Circuit’s
transfer direction and its determination that the FTCA should yield
to the Tucker Act under the facts presented.49
3.

Importance of the case
In so holding, the Federal Circuit continued the Fifth Circuit’s
judicial comity approach. For its part, the Fifth Circuit’s decision
recognized that USM likely would have a remedy upon a transfer to
the Court of Federal Claims.50 Indeed, the Fifth Circuit suggested
how, in a contract action, USM could overcome the potential
standing pitfall due to its status as a subcontractor.51 Considering the
Fifth Circuit finding about USM’s status as a subcontractor to VT
Halter with respect to the Mark V contracts to be law of the case, the
Federal Circuit agreed with its coordinate court’s suggestion that
USM was within the class of those authorized to recover upon proof
of injury from the government’s breach of the contracts’ limited
rights provisions.52 The Federal Circuit even suggested that USM may
45. See id. at 1368–70 (describing cases from the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the
Third, Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits).
46. Id. at 1368.
47. Id. at 1374.
48. Id. at 1365.
49. Id. at 1374.
50. See id. (asserting that “USM may have a meaningful remedy in the Claims
Court concern[ing] the possibility that USM has a takings claim”).
51. Id. at 1372–73. As a subcontractor to VT Halter, USM was not in privity of
contract with the Navy. Id. at 1364. To enforce its right under a contract theory, the
Fifth Circuit suggested that USM may qualify as an implied third-party beneficiary
allowed to enforce the contracts’ limited-rights provisions under the Tucker Act. See
id. (noting the conclusion reached in U.S. Marine, Inc. v. United States, 478 F. App’x
106, 111–12 (5th Cir. 2012)).
52. Id. at 1373 (asserting that eligible parties include only those directly harmed
by the breach).
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recover for the misappropriation of its trade secrets under a Fifth
Amendment takings claim, which also is subject to the Court of
Federal Claims’s Tucker Act jurisdiction.53
Thus, the Fifth Circuit was able to transfer the case to a forum with
experience in adjudicating federal contracts and promote uniformity
in the development of government contracts jurisprudence without
sacrificing a seemingly wronged plaintiff in the process.54 Moreover,
the Fifth Circuit’s issuance of its opinion as “non-precedential” under
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 may be viewed as that
court’s deference to the Federal Circuit’s experience in delimiting
the boundaries between the Tucker Act and the FTCA.55
B. Sharp Electronics Corp. v. McHugh
The approximately 19,000 GSA Federal Supply Schedule contracts
account for about $50 billion, or ten percent, of overall federal
procurement spending.56 Federal agency orders from these contracts
give rise to two main contract documents: (1) the schedule contract,
negotiated between the supplier and the GSA contracting officer; and
(2) the order contract, negotiated between the supplier and the
ordering agency contracting officer.57 These interlocking contract
documents contain similar and often identical terms, with the
schedule contract setting the parameters under which orders may be
placed, and the order contract providing the detailed terms tailored
to the specific transaction.58
Who, then, makes the initial
determination under the Federal Supply Schedules Disputes Clause,
at Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 8.406-6, regarding contract
claims brought by the supplier—the ordering agency contracting
officer or the GSA schedule contracting officer?

53. Id.
54. The Federal Circuit’s agreement with the Fifth Circuit’s suggestion that USM
would have a meaningful remedy available to it in the Court of Federal Claims
allowed the Fifth Circuit and the Federal Circuit in tandem to promote the divergent
interests of preserving congressionally dictated forums and providing compensation
for parties aggrieved by the government. See id. at 1374 (undermining USM’s critique
of the Fifth Circuit decision, and stating that the Federal Circuit “[was] not prepared
to conclude that this case clearly requires sacrifice of the compensation interest”).
55. U.S. Marine, 478 F. App’x at 106 n.* (indicating that under Fifth Circuit rules
of practice, the opinion was not selected for publication and is not precedential).
56. For Vendors—Getting on Schedule, U.S. GEN. SERVS. ADMIN., http://www.gsa.gov
/portal/content/198473?utm_source=FAS&utm_medium=print-radio&utm_term=HP
_03_Businesses_schedule&utm_campaign=shortcuts (last updated Mar. 17, 2014).
57. Sharp Elecs. Corp. v. McHugh, 707 F.3d 1367, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (Plager,
J., dissenting).
58. Id. at 1369.
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In Sharp Electronics Corp. v. McHugh,59 a divided Federal Circuit
interpreted FAR 8.406-6 as creating an almost irrebuttable
presumption that such disputes be decided by the GSA schedule
contracting officer in the first instance.60 The majority so held almost
apologetically, acknowledging that the ordering agency contracting
officer often has the superior vantage and invited the acquisition
regulators to amend FAR 8.406-6 to clarify the roles of the respective
contracting officers in addressing disputes.61
1.

Background
The Army procured Sharp copiers under GSA Special Item
Number 51-58, lease to ownership plans (“LTOP”) copiers.62 The
LTOP copiers program allows agencies to lease copiers for a defined
period of time, at the end of which title vests in the agency.63 The
order contract called for monthly lease payments over a base year and
three option years, and the schedule contract included a “Premature
Discontinuance Provision” that required the ordering agency to pay,
in the event of early termination, the monthly lease charge for any
months remaining on the lease.64
The Army exercised option years one and two, entered bilateral
modifications with Sharp that exercised the first nine months of option
year three, but ended the order contract three months short of its full
four-year term.65 Sharp claimed that the early termination triggered the
accelerated payments under the schedule contract’s early termination
clause, while the Army viewed the order contract modifications as a
bilateral agreement to shorten option year three to nine months,
rendering the Premature Discontinuance Provision inapplicable.66
59. 707 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
60. Id. at 1375.
61. Through coordinated action, the Defense Acquisition Regulations Council
and the Civilian Agency Acquisition Council prepare and issue FAR revisions. FAR
1.201-1(a) (2013).
62. Sharp, 707 F.3d at 1371.
63. See id.
64. Id. at 1370–71. The LTOP program is designed to comply with the AntiDeficiency Act, which generally limits federal contracts to single year commitments,
while the early termination clause gives the supplier assurance that the option years
will be exercised. See Andrew K. Wible, Sharp Electronics Corp. v. McHugh: The NotSo-Bright-Line, or How I Learned To Stop Worrying and Love My Schedule CO, 100 Fed.
Cont. Rep. (BNA) 180 (Aug. 13, 2013). Because the lease cost does not include the
cost of maintenance and supplies, an agency may choose to absorb the lease costs of
unused months where it can secure a better overall deal. See FED. ACQUISITION SERV,
CONTRACT NO. GS-25F-0037M, AUTHORIZED FEDERAL SUPPLY SCHEDULE PRICE LIST 8
(2001), available at https://www.gsaadvantage.gov/ref_text/GS25F0037M/0MGB8A
.2R68F8_GS-25F-0037M_SCHEDULE36TANDC.PDF.
65. Sharp, 707 F.3d at 1370.
66. Id. at 1371.
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Sharp submitted its claim for early termination payments to the
Army contracting officer, who took no action, resulting in a “deemed
denial” of the claim under 41 U.S.C. § 7103(f)(5).67 Sharp appealed
the contracting officer’s denial of the claim to the Armed Services
Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA).68 Although Sharp and the
Army agreed that Sharp had properly submitted its claim to the
ordering agency contracting officer and had properly appealed the
deemed denial to the ASBCA, sua sponte, the ASBCA determined
that it did not have jurisdiction.69 In the Board’s view, under FAR
8.406-6, the claim should have been put to the GSA schedule
contracting officer with any appeal brought to the Civilian Board of
Contract Appeals.70
Under the Contract Disputes Act, supplier claims, such as Sharp’s
claimed entitlement to termination payments, must be submitted to
the appropriate contracting officer for a final decision.71 Thus, if the
Army contracting officer’s “deemed denial” of Sharp’s claim did not
constitute the “final decision” of the “appropriate contracting
officer,” there was no valid basis for the ASBCA’s jurisdiction.72
In the context of GSA schedule contracts, FAR 8.406-6, “Disputes,”
governs the “appropriate contracting officer” determination. Until
2002, the clause required all disputes under delivery orders to be
referred to the schedule contracting officer.73 In proposing what
would become the current rule, the Defense Acquisition Regulations
Council and the Civilian Agency Acquisition Council stated that the
purpose of the revision was “to permit the ordering office contracting
officer to issue a final decision regarding disputes pertaining solely to
performance of schedule orders.”74

67. Id. at 1370.
68. Id. Since 2007, there have been two main federal boards of contract appeals.
The Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals is responsible for deciding appeals
from contracting officer decisions in the Department of Defense, and the Civilian
Board of Contract Appeals hears disputes from most other executive agencies,
including the GSA. See JUDGE WILLIAM A. CAMPBELL ET AL., PRACTICING BEFORE THE
FEDERAL BOARDS OF CONTRACT APPEALS 1 (2012). This distinction is important here,
as an appeal from a claim denial by the schedule contracting officer would have been
to the Civilian BCA and not the Armed Services BCA.
69. Sharp, 707 F.3d at 1371.
70. Id.
71. 41 U.S.C. § 7103(a)(1) (2012).
72. Sharp, 707 F.3d at 1370–71.
73. Id.
74. Federal Acquisition Regulation; Federal Supply Schedule Order Disputes and
Incidental Items, 65 Fed. Reg. 79,702, 79,702 (proposed Dec. 19, 2000) (to be
codified at 48 C.F.R. pts. 8, 51).
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The amended rule indicates that whether a dispute concerns the
performance of orders under a schedule contract or the terms and
conditions of such contracts, the dispute is to be presented to the
ordering activity contracting officer.75 For disputes concerning the
performance of orders, the ordering activity contracting officer may
either issue a final decision herself and notify the schedule
contracting officer of that decision,76 or forward the dispute to the
schedule contracting officer.77 If, however, the dispute pertains to
terms and conditions of the schedule contract, the ordering activity
contracting officer must refer the dispute to the schedule contracting
officer for resolution, and notify the contractor of the referral.78 The
contractor may appeal final decisions to the Board of Contractor
Appeals that services the agency that issued the final decision, or to the
Court of Federal Claims.79 The regulation also directs contracting
officers to use alternative dispute resolution procedures under FAR
33.204 and FAR 33.214 “to the maximum extent practicable.”80
2.

The Federal Circuit’s determination
On appeal of the ASBCA’s jurisdictional ruling to the Federal
Circuit, both parties contended that the Army contracting officer was
the appropriate official to issue a final decision.81 The Army argued
that the claim could be resolved with reference solely to the order
contract’s modifications that exercised option periods, while Sharp
contended that the early termination provision of the schedule
contract only needed to be applied, not interpreted.82
The Federal Circuit majority purported to establish a bright-line
rule under FAR 8.406-6 that requires the schedule contracting officer
to settle all disputes that require interpreting the schedule contract
regardless of whether the disputes also require interpreting the order
or concern performance.83 Finding that resolving the dispute
required not only an analysis of the order contract’s partial exercise
of option year three and the Army’s decision not to exercise the final
75. FAR 8.406-6(a)–(b) (2013).
76. Id. 8.406-6(a)(1)(i), (a)(2).
77. Id. 8.406-6(a)(1)(ii).
78. Id. 8.406-6(b).
79. Id. 8.406-6(c).
80. Id. 8.406-6(d).
81. See Sharp Elecs. Corp. v. McHugh, 707 F.3d 1367, 1371 (2013) (explaining
that the Army and Sharp argued, respectively, that the Army contracting officer
could resolve the dispute because it related only to the parties’ contractual
obligations, and that the issue “constituted an issue of performance under the
delivery order”).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1373.
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three months of the order, but also whether those actions constituted
an early termination of the schedule contract, the majority
determined that the dispute must be decided by the GSA schedule
contracting officer in the first instance.84 In doing so, the majority
observed that the distribution of authority under FAR 8.406-6 “is less
than perfect” because it requires a determination by the GSA
schedule contracting officer, even where the ordering contracting
officer was more familiar with the case.85 But, if that perceived fault
in the FAR 8.406-6 regime should yield to expanded authority of the
ordering activity contracting officer, the majority noted that the
change must emanate from the Councils in an amendment to the
regulation, and not from the courts.86
In his dissent, Judge Plager offered a different view of the structure
of FAR 8.406-6 and of the majority’s application of its own view.87
The dissent observed that FAR 8.406-6 “is not the clearest example of
regulatory drafting” and noted that schedule contracts and order
contracts are designed to work in tandem.88 Judge Plager concluded
that, in many cases, it would be very difficult for the ordering activity
contracting officer (“CO”) to draw the line between a breach of the
two interlocking agreements.89 In such circumstances, the dissent
reasoned that FAR 8.406-6 allowed the court leeway to establish either
a “GSA CO/default rule” or an “agency CO/default,” where disputes
presumptively would be directed for appealable, final decisions.90
Given the superior “available knowledge and expertise of the agency
contracting officer” and the seeming rejection of the “GSA
CO/default rule” embodied in the 2002 amendment, Judge Plager
opted for the alternative default rule--“agency CO/default.”91 Under
this rule, disputes would be presented to the GSA schedule
contracting officer only when it was “necessary to invoke the special
expertise of the schedule CO to construe the schedule contract
provisions.”92
84. Id. at 1374–75 (suggesting that where the ordering activity contracting officer
merely had to apply, but not interpret, an undisputed schedule contract term, she
properly could do so).
85. Id. at 1375.
86. Id.
87. See id. at 1377–78 (Plager, J., dissenting) (explaining how previously, the rule
did not give as much authority to the ordering agency’s contracting officer in
resolving contract disputes as the current rule).
88. Id. at 1378.
89. See id. at 1379–80 (referring to that fine line as the “conundrum in this case”).
90. Id. at 1382.
91. Id. at 1381.
92. Id. at 1382.
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Regarding the application of the majority’s stated rule, Judge Plager
questioned “how bright” was the court’s bright-line rule, by asking
rhetorically, that when the question at issue is the interpretation and
performance of the order contract by the parties, why would it not fall
into the domain of the agency contracting officer?93
3.

Importance of the case
Given the majority’s broad interpretation of what disputes
“pertain[] to the terms and conditions of schedule contracts”
under FAR 8.406-6(b), it seems that when a contractor is at an
impasse with the ordering agency, the safer course is to seek a final
decision from the GSA schedule contracting officer.94 As a
practical matter, and although FAR 8.406-6 provides that all claims
be channeled through the ordering activity contracting officer, the
contractor most often must submit the claim directly to the
schedule contracting officer. 95 Indeed, as was the case here, many
claims presented to contracting officers are never acted upon and
are deemed denied under 41 U.S.C. § 7103(f)(5).96 The majority
here indicated that Sharp could resubmit its claim to the GSA
schedule contracting officer, 97 a position the dissent did not find
in the rule, but noted it “apparently permit[ed].”98
Above all, however, Sharp Electronics positions FAR 8.406-6 as a
settlement-forcing rule, which would be consistent with the Contract
Disputes Act. The requirement that all claims first be submitted to
the ordering activity contracting officer makes sense, as it is the
agency that will ultimately be responsible for paying any negotiated
settlement or judgment and thus is the entity with an interest in
settling disputes early, before they develop into certified claims under
FAR 33.206 and FAR 33.207.99 As noted in both opinions, the
93. Id.
94. See FAR 8.406-6(b) (2013) (stating that disputes involving the contract terms
and conditions should be referred to the scheduling contract officer).
95. Id.
96. Sharp, 707 F.3d at 1377 (Plager, J., dissenting). It is no small irony that
jurisdiction often depends on the correct contracting officer doing nothing with a
submitted claim.
97. Id. at 1375.
98. See id. at 1381, 1383 n.10 (noting that in GTSI Corp. v. Equal Emp’t
Opportunity Comm’n, CBCA 2718, 12-2 BCA ¶ 35,141, the contractor “solve[d] the
conundrum” of whom to submit the claim by presenting identical claims to both the
ordering activity contracting officer and the GSA schedule contracting officer);
Wible, supra note 64, at 2 (stating that “in practice” the ordering agency contracting
officer “never” refers claims to the schedule contracting officer, and the contractor
must do so itself, “even though the FAR makes no provision for such action”).
99. FAR 8.406-6(a)(1)(i), 8.406(a)(2). Both opinions questioned the practice
where contractors submit claims directly to schedule contracting officers, seemingly
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ordering agency contracting officer is the official in the process
dictated by the FAR who is most familiar with the facts of the
contract, and who thus holds the best hope of understanding the
dispute’s history and development.100
Typically, as disputes arise contractors will attempt to engage the
ordering agency contracting officer in negotiations to resolve
assertions of entitlement to equitable adjustments to the contract
price.101 If the contracting officer does not offer a satisfactory
settlement, the contractor sometimes will present a draft claim to the
contracting officer to prompt settlement.102 The requirement of FAR
8.406-6 that the contractor first present claims to the ordering agency
contracting officer, even where the schedule contracting officer must
issue the “final decision,” can be seen as a last-ditch settlementforcing mechanism before the matter is put before a contracting
officer whose agency does not have the same stake in the dispute.
The requirement also supports the government policy, articulated at
FAR 33.204, “to try to resolve all contractual issues in controversy by
mutual agreement at the contracting officer’s level” and before
submission of a claim.103
It took a full ten years for the amended FAR 8.406-6 to reach the
Federal Circuit.104 To the degree that Sharp Electronics adds new
uncertainty to disputes under delivery orders to those that already
exist when claims proceed beyond the ordering activity contracting
officer, for both contractor and agency alike, the case counsels
renewed emphasis on identifying, addressing, and resolving disputes
as early as possible.
C. Brandt v. United States
The Tucker Act grants jurisdiction to the Court of Federal Claims
to hear cases against the United States on any claim based on a
constitutional matter, congressional act, executive regulation, or any
contrary to FAR 8.406-6, which states such referrals must be made by the activity
contracting officer. The court’s observation may prompt vendors and contracting
officers alike to heed this provision of the rule.
100. Sharp, 707 F.3d at 1375, 1381 (Plager, J., dissenting).
101. Id. at 1369 (majority opinion).
102. See id. at 1370 (noting that Sharp presented such a claim with the Army
contracting officer after the Army failed to fully exercise option year three).
103. FAR 33.204; see also Pathman Constr. Co. v. United States, 817 F.2d 1573,
1578 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (finding that “[a] major purpose of the Disputes Act was to
induce resolution of contract disputes with the government by negotiation rather
than litigation.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
104. Sharp, 707 F.3d at 1369 n.1.
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express or implied contract with the United States.105 At 28 U.S.C.
§ 1500, however, Congress divested this jurisdictional conferral for
“any claim for or in respect to which the plaintiff or his assignee has
pending in any other court any suit or process against the United
States.”106 What happens, then, when the district court has entered
judgment, but the time for filing an appeal has not yet expired? May
the plaintiff file a claim in the Court of Federal Claims based on the
same operative facts, or would the Court be divested of jurisdiction
under § 1500?
1.

Background
In Brandt v. United States,107 the Federal Circuit directly addressed
for the first time whether a claim is “pending” for purposes of § 1500
after judgment is entered but before the time for filing an appeal has
expired.108 In this case, the United States filed suit in July 2006 in the
U.S. District Court for the District of Wyoming, seeking declaratory
judgment as to a right-of-way that crossed defendant Marvin M.
Brandt’s property.109 Brandt counterclaimed to quiet title in his
favor, or, alternatively, to receive compensation for a taking of his
property.110 In April 2008, the court granted summary judgment in
favor of the government as to the right-of-way and warned Brandt
that the Court of Federal Claims would have exclusive jurisdiction
over a takings compensation claim in excess of $10,000.111 Brandt
sought to have his takings claim transferred to the Court of Federal
Claims, and the government opposed.112 In March 2009, the court
105. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (2012) (“[A]ny claim against the United States
founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of
an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United
States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort.”).
106. Id. § 1500.
107. 710 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
108. See id. at 1375 (noting the split of authority on the issue within the Court of
Federal Claims). Compare Vero Technical Support, Inc. v. United States, 94 Fed. Cl.
784, 795 (2010) (holding that a suit is “pending” under § 1500 until one renounces
his appeal rights, the time for appeal has run, or the appeal has been finally
adjudicated), and Jachetta v. United States, 94 Fed. Cl. 277, 283 (2010) (same), with
Young v. United States, 60 Fed. Cl. 418, 425 (2004) (holding that no suit is pending
following a district court’s entry of judgment), and Bolduc v. United States, 72 Fed.
Cl. 187, 196 (2006) (same), aff’d, 248 F. App’x 162 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
109. Brandt, 710 F.3d at 1371. Brandt is a rails-to-trails case under National Trails
System Improvements Act of 1988, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1244, 1248, which sets the conditions
under which abandoned railroad easements may be converted into recreational
easements for trails open to the general public. In Brandt, the property interest at
issue was an abandoned railroad right-of-way across the Brandt property that the
government planned to convert. Brandt, 710 F.3d at 1371–72.
110. Id. at 1371.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1372.
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entered judgment for the government, denied Brandt’s motion to
transfer, and dismissed Brandt’s takings claim.113
2.

The Federal Circuit clarifies § 1500
On April 28, 2009, Brandt filed a takings claim in the Court of
Federal Claims.114 The next day, he appealed the district court’s
judgment on the property reversion issue to the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.115 In October 2009, the Court of
Federal Claims stayed Brandt’s case pending resolution of the Tenth
Circuit appeal.116 In November 2011, upon the government’s
motion, the Court of Federal Claims lifted the stay and dismissed the
claim.117 In doing so, the court held:
(1) Brandt’s case was pending within the meaning of § 1500 when
he filed in the Court of Federal Claims because the time for filing a
notice of appeal to the Tenth Circuit had not yet expired; and (2)
Brandt’s takings claim filed in the Court of Federal Claims was for
or in respect to the claims filed in the Wyoming district court
because they shared substantially the same operative facts.118

The Federal Circuit began its analysis as to whether § 1500 applied,
requiring dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, with a twopart inquiry. It first examined whether there was another “suit or
process” pending in another court, and if so, whether the claims
asserted in the other case were “for or in respect to” the same claim
asserted in the later-filed Court of Federal Claims action.119 First, the
court noted that a counterclaim was indisputably a “suit or process”
within the meaning of § 1500.120 It then addressed the primary issue:

113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1373. This appeal was not determined until September 11, 2012, when
the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment in favor of the government.
Id. at 1372.
117. Id. at 1373. The government’s motion was prompted by the then-recent
Supreme Court decision in United States v. Tohono O’odham Nation, in which the Court
held that “two suits are for or in respect to” each other under § 1500 “if they are
based on substantially the same operative facts, regardless of the relief sought in each
suit.” 131 S. Ct. 1723, 1731 (2011). Tohono O’odham Nation thus established that
quiet title and takings compensation portions of the Brandt case were “for or in
respect to” each other under § 1500, but did not necessarily settle whether the
Wyoming suit was “pending” under the statute at the time of Brandt’s Court of
Federal Claims filing. See id.
118. Brandt, 710 F.3d at 1373 (internal quotation marks omitted).
119. Id. at 1374.
120. Id.
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was Brandt’s suit “pending” after judgment and before Brandt filed
his notice of appeal?121
The court observed that the statutory text requires that a case
must be pending in any other court to divest the Court of Federal
Claims of jurisdiction.122 Recognizing that a case is closed from
the district court’s docket after judgment is entered and that a new
case is open at a court of appeals only after an appeal has been
filed, the court held that during the interim period, the case is not
open in either court.123 This means, the court reasoned, “there is a
period of time when a case is not, as the statute requires, ‘pending
in any other court.’”124 The Federal Circuit therefore reversed the
Court of Federal Claims’s dismissal for lack of jurisdiction and
remanded the case.125
In concurrence, Judge Prost urged the Federal Circuit to overturn
the order-of-filing rule established in Tecon Engineers, Inc. v. United
States,126 which held that a later-filed action in another court does
not divest the Court of Federal Claims of jurisdiction.127 In Judge
Prost’s view, Tecon Engineers created a loophole to subvert the
purpose of § 1500 that allows plaintiffs to avoid § 1500’s
jurisdictional bar by filing in the Court of Federal Claim before
filing a related appeal or district court suit.128 Judge Prost believed
this “defeats Congress’s unequivocally clear purpose for the statute”
and renders § 1500 “without meaningful force.”129
3.

Importance of the case
The tactical loophole exploited by Brandt and explained by
Judge Prost invites the potential for duplicative and wasteful
litigation. Indeed, here Brandt’s U.S. Supreme Court appeal in
the quiet title action was successful and title to the property
reverted to the Brandts,130 rendering the takings claim in the Court
of Federal Claims moot.131
121. Id. at 1375.
122. Id. at 1378.
123. Id. at 1378–79. In other words, the mere possibility of appeal does not make
a claim “pending” for purposes of § 1500; it is only after the filing of the notice of
appeal that the case becomes “pending” in another court. Id. at 1378.
124. Id. at 1379.
125. Id. at 1370.
126. 343 F.2d 943 (Cl. Ct. 1965).
127. Id. at 949.
128. Brandt, 710 F.3d at 1381 (Prost, J., concurring).
129. Id. at 1381–82.
130. Marvin M. Brandt Revocable Trust v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1257, 1268 (2014).
131. See id. at 1263 n.3 (noting that the compensation case had been stayed
pending resolution of the reversionary interest case by the Supreme Court).
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D. Northrop Grumman Computing Systems, Inc. v. United States
Northrop Grumman Computing Systems v. United States132 proves that
sometimes two wrongs can make a right. The Federal Circuit
ruled that Northrop had presented a valid termination claim to
the contracting officer, giving rise to appellate jurisdiction, where
Northrop had both failed to (1) notify Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) that it had assigned the revenue stream under
the contract to a financing institution and (2) state that its claim
was a pass-through claim on behalf of that third party.133 Because
Northrop’s original assignment was void for lack of agency notice
under the Anti-Assignment Act,134 the Federal Circuit reasoned
Northrop had properly, if inadvertently, submitted a claim on its
own behalf.135
1.

Background
In July 2001, ICE issued a commercial item delivery order to
Northrop’s predecessor entity, Logicon FDC, under which
Northrop was to lease and provide support for commercial
computer network monitoring software produced by a third party,
Oakley Networks (“Oakley”).136
The agreement between Northrop and ICE stated that Northrop
would provide both the software and services through a lease for a
twelve-month base period and three twelve-month options.137 The
total value, if ICE exercised all options, was to be approximately $3.6
million.138 A separate agreement between Northrop and Oakley
required Northrop to pay an up-front fee to Oakley of
approximately $2.9 million.139 Four days later, ICE handed
Northrop an “essential use statement” in order to facilitate third
party funding for Oakley software.140 Northrop entered into a
third agreement, this one with ESCgov, Inc. (“ESCgov”), to finance
its lease of the Oakley software.141 Under that agreement, ESCgov
would pay Northrop approximately $3.3 million in exchange for

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

709 F.3d 1107 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
Id. at 1113.
41 U.S.C. § 15 (2012).
Northrop, 709 F.3d at 1113.
Id. at 1109.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Northrop’s assignment of all payments to ESCgov.142
The
government did not know about the assignment to ESCgov until it
was revealed through discovery in this matter.143
In the month after the delivery order was executed, it was amended
to address “Northrop’s first-priority status, the government’s best
efforts to secure funding, and a prohibition on the government
substituting comparable software for the Oakley software.”144 All of
these amendments were apparently intended to ensure the
government exercised all options.
Notwithstanding the post-award contract modifications identifying
the essential nature of the Oakley software and the expected fouryear term, the government failed to exercise any of the delivery order
options.145 The government asserted that it was not terminating
Northrop’s contract, but that it was unable to fund the options
because of a lack of appropriations.146 Northrop filed a timely
certified claim with the contracting officer, alleging breach of the
modified delivery order, and seeking $2.7 million in damages.147
Upon the contracting officer’s denial, Northrop appealed to the
Court of Federal Claims.148 When the government learned of
Northrop’s assignment of claims to ESCgov, it sought dismissal on
grounds that Northrop’s claim was invalid for failing to provide
adequate notice of the nature of its claim.149 The Court of Federal
Claims dismissed Northrop’s claim because Northrop failed “to alert
the contracting officer to the potential application of the AntiAssignment Act and Severin doctrine [and] also to put him on notice”
about other issues associated with pass-through claims.150

142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 1110.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (referring to
Severin v. United States, 99 Ct. Cl. 435 (1943)). While Northrop’s first claim was
pending it submitted a very similar claim to the contracting officer, this time
detailing the financing arrangement. The contracting officer refused to issue a final
decision on Northrop’s second claim, and Northrop appealed the deemed denial of
its second claim to the Court of Federal Claims, which dismissed it based on the
contracting officer’s inability to address a claim that arose from the same operative
facts Northrop’s pending claim. Id. at 1111. While advancing its second claim,
Northrop appealed the denial of its first claim to the Federal Circuit. Id.
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2.

The Federal Circuit finds Northrop’s assignment invalid
On appeal, the Federal Circuit noted that jurisdiction over a
Contract Disputes Act (CDA) claim is premised on a final decision
over a valid claim, so that a defect in Northrop’s claim would destroy
jurisdiction.151 It then examined decisions establishing the minimum
requirements for a CDA claim,152 including primarily Reflectone, Inc. v.
Dalton.153 In Reflectone, the Federal Circuit held that the FAR “sets
forth the only three requirements of a non-routine ‘claim’ for money:
that it be (1) a written demand, (2) seeking, as a matter of right, (3)
the payment of money in a sum certain.”154 The court went on to say
that a claim does not need to comply with a particular form or
wording, but it must provide “a clear and unequivocal statement that
gives the contracting officer sufficient notice of the claim.”155
The Federal Circuit held that because Northrop failed to notify the
government of the assignment, it became “null and void” under the
Assignment of Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3727.156 The court stated,
however, that a failed attempt to assign a claim against the United States
does not forfeit the claim but will leave it as it was before the attempted
assignment.157 Thus, Northrop was the proper party to bring this claim,
and the Severin doctrine did not apply in this case.158 The court held,
therefore, Northrop’s failure to notify the contracting officer about
financing information did not deprive him of adequate notice
concerning the basis of Northrop’s otherwise valid claim.159
3.

Importance of the case
Northrop’s circumstance highlights the potential liabilities that
may arise with greater frequency as the government strives for
strategic sourcing and reduced costs, especially in its information
technology purchases. Here, the prime contractor (Northrop) and
the subcontract vendor (Oakley) sought to expedite their revenue by
151. Id. at 1111–12 (citing M. Maropakis Carpentry, Inc. v. United States, 609 F.3d
1323, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Sharman Co. v. United States, 2 F.3d 1564, 1568 (Fed.
Cir. 1993)).
152. Id. at 1112.
153. 60 F.3d 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
154. Id. at 1575.
155. Northrop, 709 F.3d at 1112.
156. Id. at 1113. The court’s decision conflates the Anti-Assignment Act (not
relevant here) with the Assignment of Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3727 (2012), which was
implicated by Northrop’s assignment of proceeds to ESCgov. See Northrop, 709 F.3d
at 1113.
157. Northrop, 709 F.3d at 1113.
158. Id.
159. Id.
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exchanging what all parties reasonably expected to be a four-year
annuity for a lump sum payment.160 When the government changed
tack, stopping the contract and its revenue at one year, the
contractors naturally sought to avoid being the ones left holding the
bag.161 While the Federal Circuit’s opinion is silent regarding
whether and how the agreements between the contractors addressed
the possibility that options would not be exercised, the decision
emphasizes that prime contractors augment their risk by ignoring the
government notice provisions of the Anti-Assignment Act.162
II. BID PROTESTS
Two of the Federal Circuit’s precedential bid protest decisions in
2013, Orion Technology, Inc. v. United States163 and Glenn Defense Marine
Asia, PTE Ltd. v. United States,164 involved “second bite at the apple”
cases, where the protesters were denied relief by the GAO and then
filed substantively similar bid protests in the Court of Federal
Claims.165 And in the third case, Croman Corp. v. United States,166
Croman Corporation waited until other protesters’ claims were
dismissed by the GAO before filing its protest in the Court of Federal
Claims.167 In addition to the Federal Circuit’s merits decisions, these
cases highlight the amount of adjudicative process available to
disappointed offerors in “second bite at the apple” cases, an
opportunity that disappointed bidders168 increasingly are taking
advantage of.169 With contracts at stake often in the hundreds of
160. Id. at 1109.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 1113.
163. 704 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
164. 720 F.3d 901 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
165. See Robert S. Metzger & Daniel A. Lyons, A Critical Reassessment of the GAO BidProtest Mechanism, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 1225, 1248 (explaining that the Competition in
Contracting Act prevents the GAO’s dismissal of a bid protest “from impacting the
protester’s right to seek a second bite at the apple through a [Court of Federal
Claims] complaint”).
166. 724 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
167. Id. at 1361–62.
168. Just like disappointed bidders, intervenors in cases where the GAO has sustained
a protest sometimes seek to reinstate their awards by filing Court of Federal Claims cases,
arguing that the agency’s intention to implement the GAO’s allegedly arbitrary and
capricious recommended corrective action is itself arbitrary and capricious. See, e.g.,
Turner Constr. Co. v. United States, 645 F.3d 1377, 1382–83 (Fed. Cir. 2011); CBY Design
Builders v. United States, 105 Fed. Cl. 303, 308–09 (2012).
169. In their article, Metzger and Lyons counted eleven published “second bite”
cases in 2005 and seven in 2006. Metzger & Lyons, supra note 165, at 1234 & n.50.
Unpublished research conducted by one of the authors here (Callahan) and others
for the Court of Federal Claims Bar Association identified twenty-one, eighteen, and
twenty “second bite” decisions published by the Court of Federal Claims in 2010,
2011, and 2012, respectively. See Dennis J. Callahan et al., Table of “True Second
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millions or billions of dollars, even the most substantial legal fees
incurred in such serial bid protest litigation may pale in comparison.
In addition to strategic advantages that may be gained in prolonged
bid protest litigation,170 it is not at all unusual for “second bite”
protests to pay off.171
A. Orion Technology, Inc. v. United States
The Federal Circuit’s January 14, 2013, opinion in Orion Technology,
Inc. v. United States, provides insight, although not perfect clarity,
concerning the Federal Circuit’s view on three issues of potential
importance to bid protest litigants at the Court of Federal Claims.
First, in the holding for which the decision is most likely to be cited,
the court held that under the specific facts of that case, Orion
Technology, Inc. (“Orion”) had standing to challenge the agency’s
discretionary decision to exclude Orion’s facially deficient proposal
from consideration for award.172 That determination, as explained
below, provides a potential check on agency decisions that might
have previously been insulated from review based on standing
grounds.173 Second, the court upheld as reasonable the agency’s
decision not to consider Orion’s proposal or to allow Orion an
opportunity to cure its defects where problems in its proposal
submission precluded effective agency review.174 Third, the court’s
opinion could be read as a decision on the merits of Orion’s bid protest
by the Federal Circuit.175 Whether the Federal Circuit’s review of bid

Bite” Cases (June 2013) (unpublished table of cases) (on file with authors and the
American University Law Review).
170. See, e.g., Metzger & Lyons, supra note 165, at 1240 (“As long as the marginal
profit earned by extending the legacy contract exceeds the cost of the protest . . . the
temptation to engage in strategic behavior is always present. Alternatively, a failed
bidder may stay the award through a GAO protest and then seek settlement with the
awardee by getting a portion of the contract as a subcontractor.”). Incumbent
contractors who lose re-competed contracts may file low-probability protests in order
to prolong their incumbency, and upon losing at the GAO, where the stay of award
may be automatic, seek a voluntary stay from the agency or an injunction against
effecting the new award while the “second bite” protest is pending at the Court of
Federal Claims. Id. Or the disappointed bidder may prolong the bid protest process
as leverage in negotiating with the awardee for a portion of the work. Id.
171. See, e.g., Lab. Corp. of Am. v. United States, 108 Fed. Cl. 549, 569 (2012);
Contracting, Consulting, Eng’g, LLC v. United States, 104 Fed. Cl. 334, 360 (2012);
HP Enter. Servs., LLC v. United States, 104 Fed. Cl. 230, 246 (2012) (granting the
plaintiff’s motion for judgment).
172. Orion Tech., Inc. v. United States, 704 F.3d 1344, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
173. See infra Part II. A. 2. (discussing the court’s analysis on the appropriate test
for determining standing).
174. Orion, 704 F.3d at 1349.
175. Id. at 1347.
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protest decisions from the Court of Federal Claims authorized the
court to reject Orion’s protest in the absence of a final decision on
the merits by the Court of Federal Claims is an interesting question
not addressed by the opinion.
1.

Background
Orion submitted a proposal to the Army’s Mission and Installation
Contracting Command competing for a Support Base Services
(“SBS”) Multiple Award Task Order Contract (“MATOC”) set aside
for small businesses.176 The objective of SBS was to obtain services in
support of the Army’s mobilization, demobilization, deployment,
redeployment, and restationing of its active duty and reserve
personnel.177 SBS establishes contract support to minimize the
number of mobilized Reserve Component (“RC”) units and soldiers
providing non-inherently governmental functions addressed in twelve
task areas identified in the SBS Performance Work Statement
(“PWS”).178 The Army intended to award six to eight contracts on a
best value basis179 for this five-year program with a ceiling of $983
The relevant solicitation provisions indicated that
million.180
noncompliance with the proposal requirements “may” result in
elimination from the competition.181
Although Orion submitted its proposal prior to the deadline set in
the Request for Proposals (RFP), it failed to timely submit proprietary
cost/pricing information for five of its eight proposed
subcontractors.182 Eight days past the submission deadline, the Army
rejected two packages purporting to provide Orion’s missing
subcontractor cost data.183 Orion protested the rejection of its
proposal to the Army and the GAO, both of which denied Orion’s
protest for failing to supply required information in its proposal.184
The Army later amended the solicitation and “sought new cost/price
proposals from [] qualifying offerors.”185 Orion attempted to
176. Id. at 1346.
177. Orion Tech., Inc. v. United States, 102 Fed. Cl. 218, 219 n.2 (2011), aff’d, 704
F.3d 1344.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 220.
180. M—Support Base Services, F EDB IZ O PPS .GOV , https://www.fbo.gov/index?s
=opportunity&mode=form&tab=core&id=17d0bfc33fb434c3772ced44a64d839b (last
visited May 12, 2014).
181. Orion, 704 F.3d at 1346.
182. Id.
183. Id. (noting that the packages were returned unopened due to their
untimeliness).
184. Id. at 1347.
185. Id.
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resubmit its proposal and thereby cure any prior defects, but the
Army rejected Orion’s proposal on the basis that its prior elimination
excluded Orion from the competition.186 Orion again protested to
the agency and the GAO, but both dismissed Orion’s challenge for
lack of standing because it was not an “interested party.”187 Then
Orion protested to the Court of Federal Claims.188 The agency moved
to dismiss for lack of standing and, in the alternative, for judgment on
the administrative record.189 The court held that Orion lacked standing
to bring a bid protest under 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(1) because it had
submitted a non-compliant proposal.190 The court thus dismissed the
government’s motion for judgment on the administrative record as
moot, but indicated that if Orion had standing, the court would have
denied Orion’s protest on the merits.191
2. Orion has standing entitling it to judicial review of the agency’s exercise
of discretion
The court began by analyzing whether the pre-award “non-trivial
competitive injury” test or the more stringent post-award “substantial
chance” test of standing applied to the post-submission but pre-award
elimination of an offeror’s proposal.192 Siding with the government,
the court determined that the more lenient standard applicable to
pre-award protests did not apply.193 That standard, articulated in
Weeks Marine, Inc. v. United States,194 sets out an exception to the
general requirement for an offeror to show that it had a substantial
chance of winning an award because in pre-bid, pre-award protests “it
is difficult, if not impossible, to establish a substantial chance of
winning the contract.”195
The Army had rejected Orion’s proposal for failing to comply with
bid submission requirements.196 Notwithstanding the missing data,
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(1) (2012) (conferring jurisdiction on the
Court of Federal Claims “to render judgment on an action by an interested party
objecting to a solicitation by a Federal agency for bids or proposals for a proposed
contract”).
191. See Orion, 704 F.3d at 1347 (reasoning that, due to Orion’s missing information,
the Army made a rational decision to exclude Orion from competition).
192. Id. at 1348.
193. Id.
194. 575 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
195. See Orion, 704 F.3d at 1348 (citing Weeks Marine, 575 F.3d at 1361–62)(noting
the reason behind the exception created in Weeks Marine).
196. Id. at 1346–49.
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Orion’s bid was within the competitive range that the Army
established after it had excluded Orion’s bid but before it responded
to Orion’s initial GAO protest.197 Importantly, the solicitation
language was permissive, providing the Army with discretion in
deciding whether to exclude Orion’s proposal.198
Although it was “beyond question that the Army had the discretion
to keep Orion’s proposal alive,” the court recognized that denying
Orion standing would bar any challenge to the Army’s discretionary
decision.199 The court clarified that “the mere timely submission of a
proposal” does not automatically confer standing.200 Orion had
standing, the court found, because the Army, using its discretion,
chose not to keep Orion’s proposal, but Orion’s original proposal
was within the later-established competitive range.201 The court
distinguished these circumstances from COMINT Systems Corp. v.
United States,202 in which the court denied COMINT standing because
it had no substantial chance of winning the contract due to its low
technical rating.203
This first holding of Orion has the potential to help a protester who
can articulate some abuse of discretion in the source selection
process despite a determination by the agency that the protester’s
offer is ineligible for award.204 Under this holding, a protester who
has been excluded from the competition for some defect in its
proposal may contest an award to—or inclusion in the competitive
range of—an offeror with the same defect.205 After Orion, so long as
that exclusion decision is discretionary, the protester will be able to
challenge, as disparate treatment, an agency’s decision to exclude its
offer while keeping another with a similar defect.206 Even so, where
the agency can show it has no discretion to keep a non-conforming
offer, a protester aware that another offeror made the same mistake

197. Id. at 1349.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. 700 F.3d 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
203. Orion, 704 F.3d at 1349–50 n.1 (citing COMINT, 700 F.3d at 1383–84).
204. Id. at 1349.
205. See id. (reasoning that because the Army could have reviewed Orion’s revised
proposal—which was in the competitive price range—but chose not to, Orion has
standing to contest the award to another offeror); Orion Tech., Inc. v. United States,
102 Fed. Cl. 218, 224 (2011) (noting that the Army evaluated other offeror’s revised
proposals but refused to evaluate Orion’s revised proposal), aff’d, 704 F.3d 1344.
206. Orion, 704 F.3d at 1349.
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may not be found to have standing to challenge the agency’s failure
to exclude the other offeror.207
The court, therefore, reversed the Court of Federal Claims’s
decision that Orion lacked standing.208 Rather than remand to the
Court of Federal Claims to consider Orion’s protest, the Federal
Circuit proceeded to deny Orion’s protest on the merits.209
3.

Agencies have substantial discretion in procurement decisions
In addressing the merits of the protest, the Federal Circuit
reinforced the well-established rule that “[a]gencies are entitled to a
high degree of deference when faced with challenges to procurement
decisions.”210
Protests can only succeed when the agency’s
The
determination is clearly irrational and unreasonable.211
reviewing court determines “whether the contracting agency
provided a coherent and reasonable explanation of its exercise of
discretion,” which requires the unsuccessful bidder to show the award
decision lacked a rational basis.212
Applying this high standard to Orion’s facts, the court noted that
the solicitation gave the Army discretion to reject incomplete
proposals, such as Orion’s.213 Further, the Army previously explained
to Orion that the missing information made it impossible to conduct
a cost realism analysis.214 The lack of subcontractor cost data
required the agency to make assumptions, which it said it could not
make.215 The Army’s explanation of this basis, the court concluded,
was coherent and reasonable.216 The court also noted that the agency
was under no obligation to enter discussions to allow Orion to fix the
defects in its submission.217 In fact, the court noted, doing so prior to

207. See Philips Healthcare Informatics, B-400733.8 et al., 2009 CPD ¶ 246, at *3
(Comp. Gen. Dec. 2, 2009) (finding the protester lacked standing to pursue a protest
that the awardee, like the protester, had submitted an improper conditional offer at
least where “there was another proposal besides the awardee’s eligible for award”);
see also Orion, 704 F.3d at 1349 (focusing on the fact that the Army had discretion to
decide whether or not to exclude Orion’s proposal).
208. Orion, 704 F.3d at 1349–50.
209. Id. at 1350.
210. Id. at 1351 (citing Impresa Construzioni Geom. Domenico Garufi v. United
States, 238 F.3d 1324, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2001)).
211. Id. (citing R & W Flammann GmbH v. United States, 339 F.3d 1320, 1322
(Fed. Cir. 2003)).
212. Id. (quoting Impresa Construzioni, 238 F.3d at 1332–33).
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
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a competitive range determination was prohibited by FAR 52.2151(c)(3)(ii).218
4.

The Federal Circuit can affirm on any basis supported by the record
The court held that it could “affirm a decision of the trial court
upon any ground supported by the record.”219 It then indicated that
the Court of Federal Claims had reviewed an extensive record and
would have found the agency’s actions reasonable if not mooted by
the standing decision.220 In the court’s view, because the parties had
once again briefed the merits on appeal,221 “it [was] proper to
consider the reasonability of the Army’s actions.”222
The court’s pronouncement appears to be inconsistent with its
statutory authority to review “final decisions” of the Court of Federal
Claims; it unquestionably ignores two of the three claims advanced by
Orion in its protest; and it offends the requirement that review under
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) consider the entire
administrative record.223 Moreover, the cases the court cites for the
proposition that it can affirm the Court of Federal Claims on any
ground supported by the record do not appear to justify such a
liberal construction of appellate authority.224
Orion sought a rehearing at the Federal Circuit on this basis, but
its request was denied without explanation.225 In its petition, Orion
argued three points:
(1) the Federal Circuit lacks original
jurisdiction to “affirm” a non-existent final decision or judgment; (2)
the Federal Circuit’s decision was premised upon only part of the
administrative record and did not benefit from argument on the
protest merits; and (3) Counts II and III of Orion’s protest were
218. Id.; see also FAR 52.215–1(c)(3)(ii) (2013) (providing limited conditions
under which a late proposal, modification, or revision will be accepted).
219. Orion, 704 F.3d at 1350 (citing Datascope Corp. v. SMEC, Inc., 879 F.2d 820,
822 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 1989)).
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3) (2012) (conferring jurisdiction on the Federal
Circuit for appeals from final decisions of the Court of Federal Claims); Orion Tech.,
Inc. v. United States, 102 Fed. Cl. 218, 224 (2011) (noting Orion’s three claims for
relief were that the Army lacked a rational basis to exclude its proposal from the pool
of competition, that the Army lacked a rational basis for refusing to evaluate its
proposal, and that the Army’s refusal to evaluate its revised proposal violated certain
regulations), aff’d, 704 F.3d 1344.
224. See Orion, 704 F.3d at 1350; see also Jaffke v. Dunham, 352 U.S. 280, 281 (1957)
(per curiam) (“A successful party in the District Court may sustain its judgment on
any ground that finds support in the record.”); Datascope Corp. v. SMEC, Inc., 879
F.2d 820, 822 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (“Appellees always have the right to assert
alternative grounds for affirming the judgment that are supported by the record.”).
225. See Order Denying Panel Rehearing, Orion, 704 F.3d 1344 (No. 12-5062).
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independent of the merits of Count I and not ruled upon by either
the Court of Federal Claims or the Federal Circuit.226
By statute, the Federal Circuit is only authorized to review “final
decisions” of the Court of Federal Claims.227 Further, under 28
U.S.C. § 1491(b)(1) the Court of Federal Claims is the sole court
entitled to “render judgment” on a bid protest in excess of $10,000.228
The standards set forth in the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706, apply to bid
protests, including the requirement that the court decide based upon
access to the entire record.229 Orion argued that these authorities
required the Federal Circuit to remand to the Court of Federal
Claims rather than affirm a non-final decision.230
The language of the opinions that the court cited supports the
proposition that a litigant is not prevented procedurally from advancing
an argument on appeal that is supported by the record.231 In this
regard, both cited cases addressed the procedural impact of a party’s
attempt, or failure, to file a cross-appeal of the reviewing court’s
authority to consider those issues.232 The Supreme Court, in Jaffke v.
United States,233 ultimately remanded that case for further consideration,
refusing to decide the issue of the impact of improperly excluded
evidence, an affidavit, in the first instance.234 Jaffke, thus, does not stand
for the proposition the Federal Circuit advanced.235
226. See Plaintiff-Appellant’s Petition for Panel Rehearing at 1–2, id. (No. 12-5062),
2013 WL 1821856, at *1–3 (arguing that the Federal Circuit did not have the full
administrative record and that, consequently, its affirmance violated 28 U.S.C. § 1491).
227. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3).
228. Id. § 1491(b)(1).
229. Id. § 1491(b)(4); see 5 U.S.C. § 706 (“In making the foregoing
determinations, the court shall review the whole record or those parts of it cited by a
party . . . .”).
230. Plaintiff-Appellant’s Petition, supra note 226, at 1.
231. Orion, 704 F.3d at 1350; see also Jaffke v. Dunham, 352 U.S. 280, 281 (1957)
(per curiam) (holding that when a party is successful in a district court, it may
“sustain its judgment on any ground that finds support in the record”).
232. See Jaffke, 352 U.S. at 281 (explaining that when a district court erroneously
excluded an admissible affidavit, the Court of Appeals can rule on its admissibility
even when a cross-appeal was not filed); Datascope Corp. v. SMEC, Inc., 879 F.2d
820, 822 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (noting that it is improper to file a “cross-appeal for the
sole purpose of preserving [one’s] right to offer arguments in support of the
judgment”).
233. 352 U.S. 280 (1957)(per curiam).
234. Jaffke, 352 U.S. at 281.
235. Compare id. (stating that a cross-appeal was not required for the Court of
Appeals to determine the admissibility of an affidavit and remanding for the Court of
Appeals to make this determination because it had not initially passed on the issue),
with Orion, 704 F.3d at 1350 (deciding the issue of reasonability when the trial court
analyzed the issue but discarded it as moot). Note that the Federal Circuit cited
Orion for this same proposition in Croman Corp. v. United States, 724 F.3d 1357, 1367
n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2013). In Croman, the Court of Federal Claims had issued a “belts and
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B. Glenn Defense Marine (Asia), PTE Ltd. v. United States
Glenn Defense Marine (Asia), PTE Ltd. v. United States involved a
disappointed offeror’s post-award protest of a Navy contract award
that was denied by the Court of Federal Claims.236 In a split decision,
a majority of the Federal Circuit affirmed the lower court decision
and addressed important issues involving (1) an agency’s evaluation
of offerors’ past performance; (2) the burden of a lower-priced,
lower-rated offeror to establish competitive prejudice; and (3) the
contents of the court’s administrative record following a protest
proceeding at the GAO.237
1.

Agency discretion in past performance evaluations
The majority’s decision highlights the seemingly growing burden
on protesters seeking to challenge an agency’s discretionary past
performance evaluation and raises questions about the efficacy of the
APA to review the soundness of agency interpretations of past
performance materials.
The solicitation provided that the contract would be awarded to
the proposal “most advantageous to the Government” based on an
evaluation of the following factors in descending order of
importance: “Technical Approach, Past Performance, and Price.”238
The Navy selected MLS-Multinational Logistic Services Ltd. (“MLS”)
for award and the respective evaluations of MLS and Glenn Defense
Marine (Asia), PTE Ltd. (“GDMA”) were as follows:239
Offeror

Technical Approach

Past Performance

Evaluated Price

MLS
GDMA

Better
Better

Better
Less Than Satisfactory

$2,537,414
$1,548,200

suspenders” decision holding both that the agency’s evaluation had a rational basis
and that Croman had not demonstrated prejudice in any event. Croman Corp. v.
United States, 106 Fed. Cl. 198, 217–18, 220–21 (2012), aff’d, 724 F.3d 1357. The
court essentially said it need not address prejudice where it found a rational basis—a
proposition that is less troubling than in Orion, where the Federal Circuit effectively
found that it could act as the trier of fact so long as it determines a sufficient record
is available. See id. at 221 (explaining that because it found a rational basis for the
agency decision, the plaintiff did not meet its burden to show clear and convincing
evidence that there was prejudice).
236. Glenn Def. Marine (Asia), PTE Ltd. v. United States, 105 Fed. Cl. 541, 545,
583 (2012), aff’d, 720 F.3d 901 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
237. Glenn Def., 720 F.3d at 908, 910-11 & n.8.
238. See id. at 904 (noting that the combination of non-price factors was far more
important than price).
239. Glenn Def, 105 Fed. Cl. at 545, 553.
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Despite GDMA’s 64% price advantage, the Navy concluded that
MLS’s proposal represented the “best value” because of MLS’s
superior rating under the Past Performance factor.240
Significantly, GDMA’s “Less Than Satisfactory” past performance
rating was based on questionnaires completed by five references, which
rated GDMA’s overall performance respectively as “Outstanding,”
“Outstanding,” “Better,” “Better,” and “Satisfactory”.241 Some of the
questionnaire responses included negative comments regarding
certain aspects of GDMA’s performance.242 Despite the overall ratings
of Satisfactory or Better, the Navy relied upon the negative narrative
comments to justify its “Less Than Satisfactory” overall rating of
GDMA’s past performance.243
Notwithstanding the disconnect between the Navy’s “Less Than
Satisfactory” rating and the uniformly higher overall ratings of
GDMA’s references, the majority held that the Navy’s rating
possessed the “rational basis” required to withstand APA review.244
The Federal Circuit reasoned that, despite GDMA’s generally higher
performance ratings of “Satisfactory” or “Better” overall, the entire
record included negative narrative comments and low ratings in
several categories, which offered a reasonable basis for the Navy’s
conclusion.245 The majority relied upon “the broad discretion courts
afford agencies in the negotiated procurement process” and noted
that the agency’s interpretation of the past performance
questionnaires was “entitled to considerable deference.”246
By affording the Navy so much deference and discretion to
disregard the overall ratings of the references that provided the
context of their narrative comments, the majority’s decision appears
to weaken judicial review of past performance evaluations.247 As
Judge Moore noted in her dissent, there was a fundamental
disconnect in the Navy’s evaluation of GDMA’s past performance that
was not explained in the record:
The purported basis for such a low rating was negative comments
that some of GDMA’s references included in the past performance
240. Id. at 554–55.
241. Id. at 549, 552.
242. Id. at 549.
243. Id. at 552.
244. Glenn Def. Marine (Asia) PTE Ltd. v. United States, 720 F.3d 901, 910 (Fed.
Cir. 2013).
245. Id. at 909.
246. Id. at 908, 910.
247. See id. at 912 (Moore, J., dissenting) (noting that the Navy’s rating of GDMA’s
past performance “lacks a rational basis, both legally and mathematically”).
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questionnaires they submitted. GDMA’s references, however, did
not themselves believe that their own negative comments
warranted such a low rating. And GDMA’s references were
uniquely positioned to consider the appropriate impact to give
their own negative comments on GDMA’s overall rating, given
their interaction with GDMA over the course of the contracts at
issue . . . . GDMA received two “Outstanding,” two “Better,” and
one “Satisfactory” rating. In what universe do these ratings average
out to an overall rating of “Less than Satisfactory”?248

The majority essentially held that the deference afforded by the
APA allowed the evaluators to choose among the negative and
positive information about GDMA’s past performance (rather than
harmonizing this information).249 This decision appears to allow
agencies to selectively interpret and apply past performance
questionnaires, further adding to agencies’ broad evaluative
discretion.250 If unchecked by future decisions, APA review will
impose little meaningful discipline upon this process.251
2. Prejudice and the lower-priced, lower-rated protester: Narrowing the
ratings gap is not enough
The majority opinion created a difficult prejudice showing for
protesters with lower-priced, lower-rated proposals. The majority
essentially held that merely arguing that the ratings gap would have
been narrowed rather than overcome entirely is insufficient to show a
“substantial chance” of receiving the award.252
GDMA argued that, in light of its 64% price advantage over MLS,
there was a substantial chance that the Navy would have found
GDMA’s proposal to be the best value if GDMA narrowed the past
performance deficit with MLS from “Better” vs. “Less Than
Satisfactory” to “Better” vs. “Satisfactory.”253 GDMA asserted that
there was at least a substantial chance that the Navy would conclude

248. Id. at 913.
249. See id. at 910 (majority opinion) (noting that although the Navy provided GDMA
an opportunity to respond to concerns about its past performance, GDMA’s subsequent
corrective action lacked the detail necessary to effectively address the deficiencies).
250. See id. (holding that because the Navy established a rational basis for the
“Less than Satisfactory” rating, the court could not overturn it).
251. See id. at 914 (Moore, J., dissenting) (discussing how the Navy’s conclusions
about GDMA’s past performance are divorced from the underlying data).
252. See id. at 912 (majority opinion) (“GDMA does not provide anything but
conjecture that even with a ‘Satisfactory’ rating it would have had a substantial
chance of prevailing in the bid.”).
253. Id. at 908–09.
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that MLS’s one-tier advantage under the Past Performance factor did
not warrant paying its significantly higher price.254
The Federal Circuit ruled that GDMA failed to establish prejudice,
noting that prejudice is a “question of fact” reviewed for “clear error,”
rather than a legal issue entitled to de novo appellate review.255
Applying this standard, the Federal Circuit noted that a one-tier
elevation to GDMA’s past performance rating still would have left it
behind the awardee on this factor, thus “GDMA [did] not provide
anything but conjecture that even with a ‘Satisfactory’ rating it would
have had a substantial chance of prevailing in the bid.”256
The Federal Circuit’s reasoning raises the question of how a
protester can ever offer more than “conjecture” when arguing
prejudicial error.257 When asserting prejudice, a protester necessarily
speculates about “what might have been” had the evaluation gone
differently.258 The protest process does not currently require or
provide an opportunity for the Source Selection Authority (“SSA”) to
address how her best value tradeoff analysis might have been affected
by a change in the underlying evaluation.259 In fact, such secondguessing in the heat of litigation is judicially disfavored under the
“post hoc rationalization” doctrine.260
In this case, GDMA enjoyed a significant 64% price advantage.261
Why would there not be at least a “substantial chance” that the Navy
would opt for the cost savings offered by GDMA if its past
performance rating was only one rating less than that assigned to
MLS? The majority’s holding that GDMA did not offer enough
evidence appears to raise the bar on lower-priced protesters asserting
that a reasonable evaluation would have narrowed the technical gap
between itself and the higher-priced awardee.
254. See id. at 906–09, 912 (rejecting GDMA’s argument that with a “Satisfactory”
rating, it would have had a substantial chance of success on the bid).
255. Id. at 912.
256. Id.
257. See id. at 914 (Moore, J., dissenting) (finding that GDMA had a substantial
chance at winning the contract because its price was 64% lower than MLS and was
only slightly lower than MLS in past performance).
258. Even the majority speculated what could have been if GDMA received a
higher past performance rating. See id. at 912 (majority opinion) (affirming the
finding of the Court of Federal Claims that even if GDMA had received a higher past
performance rating, it was unclear whether that would have led GDMA to be
awarded the contract).
259. See id. at 911 (stating that the court, out of deference, does not second guess
the minute details of the procurement process).
260. See id. at 911 n.8 (rejecting GDMA’s assertion that certain Navy submissions
were post hoc rationalizations).
261. Id. at 914 (Moore, J., dissenting).
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3.

For another day: Reliance upon legal memoranda included in the
administrative record
One interesting issue raised in Glenn Defense is whether post hoc
explanations of an agency’s evaluation provided by the agency’s
attorney during a GAO protest may be used to fill factual gaps in the
record of the agency’s evaluation.262
The Navy’s legal memorandum in response to GDMA’s
supplemental protest at the GAO contained what appeared to be the
attorney’s personal conclusions about the scope, magnitude, and
complexity of offerors’ past performance examples.263 In the
subsequent Court of Federal Claims case, the trial judge appeared to
rely upon these assertions as evidence and not merely as argument
regarding the content of the agency record before the GAO.264
On appeal, GDMA argued that the allegations and rationalizations
provided in the memorandum lacked evidentiary support, as the
Navy attorney was not a member of the evaluation team, nor were the
allegations supported by an evaluator’s declaration.265 In response,
the government cited 31 U.S.C. § 3556, which provides that the
agency reports required by 31 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(2) and the GAO
decision “shall be considered to be part of the agency record subject
to review.”266 The government posited that the Navy attorney’s
explanation to the GAO was part of the administrative record and it
would be up to “the trial judge in each [Court of Federal Claims]
case to decide the weight to accord such evidence.”267
Although the Federal Circuit suggested in dicta that the lower
court’s reliance on the attorney’s unsupported explanation may have
been improper, it did not reach the question.268 In the Federal
Circuit’s view, even if the memorandum was not considered, the
contemporaneous record provided a rational basis for the agency’s
262. See id. at 911 n.8 (majority opinion) (finding that even if the purported post
hoc rationalization materials were not appropriate to consider, the Navy’s rating still
had a rational basis).
263. Brief of Plaintiff/Appellant Glenn Defense Marine (Asia), PTE, Ltd. at 29–
30, Glenn Def., 720 F.3d 901 (No. 2012-5125), 2012 WL 4762506.
264. Glenn Def. Marine (Asia), PTE Ltd. v. United States, 105 Fed. Cl. 541, 573–75
(2012), aff’d, 720 F.3d 901.
265. Brief for Plaintiff/Appellant, supra note 263, at 34; see also id. at 55–56 (citing
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 50
(1983), for the proposition that post hoc rationalizations by agency counsel are
irrelevant to judicial review).
266. Id. at 41; 31 U.S.C. § 3556 (2012).
267. Brief of Defendant-Appellee the United States at 41 n.21, Glenn Def., 720 F.3d
901 (No. 2012-5125), 2012 WL 5865521.
268. See Glenn Def., 720 F.3d at 911 n.8 (“Even if the submissions were not
appropriately considered . . . the Navy’s rating of MLS’s past performance does not
lack a rational basis.”).

GOVK.OFF.TO.WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE)

1342

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

6/23/2014 2:31 PM

[Vol. 63:1307

past performance ratings.269 Yet, in making this observation, the
Federal Circuit noted that in certain situations, such as where the
protest prompts a post-award conflict-of-interest investigation, courts
“routinely consider” evidence developed in answer to a protest.270
It is uncontroversial that the agency report required by
§ 3553(b)(2) along with the GAO’s final recommendation “shall be
considered . . . part of the agency record subject to review” in a
subsequent Court of Federal Claims bid protest.271 Oftentimes, the
protester’s and intervenor’s GAO pleadings also become part of the
administrative record and may be relied upon for limited purposes.272
Nevertheless, it is hard to believe Congress intended § 3556 to
authorize the Court of Federal Claims to rely on post hoc
explanations of agency attorneys who had no involvement in an
evaluation to supply the “rational basis” required under APA
review.273 In light of the Federal Circuit’s acknowledgments that the
entire GAO record should be part of the administrative record before
the Court of Federal Claims and that portions of the record
sometimes must be created post-award, however, it seems certain that
in coming years litigants will continue to press the courts to rely on
evidentiary gap fillers that were developed in previous GAO bid
protest proceedings.274
C. Croman Corp. v. United States
Croman Corp. v. United States is another case where the protester
brought an action in the Court of Federal Claims after an
unsuccessful GAO bid protest.275 The decision highlights the

269. Id.
270. Id. (quoting Turner Constr. Co. v. United States, 645 F.3d 1377, 1386 (Fed.
Cir. 2011)).
271. 31 U.S.C. § 3556.
272. See, e.g., Axiom Res. Mgmt., Inc. v. United States, 564 F.3d 1374, 1378–79
(Fed. Cir. 2009) (discussing the protester’s motion to supplement the administrative
record with legal pleadings before the GAO and the Court of Federal Claims’s
treatment thereof). The contents of GAO pleadings may be relevant to establishing
when the government was put on notice of certain issues, or of the reasonableness of
an agency’s decision to take corrective action in response to a protest.
273. See Glenn Def., 720 F.3d at 911 n.8 (noting GDMA’s argument that the Court
of Federal Claims improperly relied on post hoc rationalizations and the court’s
decision that the Court of Federal Claims’s determination did not lack rational
basis); see also 31 U.S.C. § 3556 (stating that in an action based on a procurement, the
procurement reports along with any recommendation of the Comptroller General
pertaining to the procurement shall be considered as part of the record).
274. See Glenn Def., 720 F.3d at 911 n.7 (citing Turner Constr., 645 F.3d at 1386).
275. See 724 F.3d 1357, 1361–62 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
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presumption of good faith afforded to agency officials and arguably
endorses a somewhat formulaic approach to agency decision-making.
In Croman, the U.S. Forest Service solicited firefighting helicopter
service.276 The RFP was set aside for small business awards of thirtyfour contract line items (CLINs), each associated with a medium or
heavy lift helicopter in a particular location.277 The Federal Circuit
addressed two challenges that bidder Croman Corporation
(“Croman”) brought against the Forest Service’s corrective action
and ultimate award decision.278
1.

Croman failed to offer clear and convincing evidence of agency bad faith
First, Croman contended that the government had no rational
basis for deleting four of thirty-four helicopter CLINs.279 Croman
asserted that the Forest Service’s proffered funding constraints were
pretextual, as evidenced by the agency’s later procurement of those
four CLINS via a separate procurement with no new funding
appropriated.280
The Federal Circuit’s opinion indicated that
Croman acknowledged that if there were real funding concerns, a
decision to cancel CLINs would have been rational.281 Therefore, the
court reasoned, the “gravamen” of Croman’s complaint was that the
agency failed to act in good faith by misrepresenting the reason for
the partial cancellation of the solicitation.282 Citing the presumption
that government officials act in good faith, the Federal Circuit held
that Croman had failed to offer clear and convincing evidence that
the agency acted in a manner other than good faith.283 The court
cited Kalvar Corp. v. United States284 for the proposition that a court
could not “abandon the presumption of good faith dealing” without
“well-nigh irrefragable proof.”285 Applying that high standard,
Croman’s first protest allegation was, not surprisingly, denied.286

276. Id. at 1359.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 1362.
279. Id. at 1362–63.
280. Id. at 1364.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. 543 F.2d 1298 (Fed. Cl. 1976).
285. Croman, 724 F.3d at 1364 (citing Kalvar, 543 F.2d at 1301–02).
286. See id. (holding that Croman’s speculations were not enough to overcome the
presumption that the government acted in good faith; thus, Croman failed to meet
its burden).
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2. The agency’s use of computer software to evaluate tradeoffs was
permissible
More interesting was Croman’s second ground, which alleged that
the agency violated FAR 15.308 where its source selection decision
failed to account for the relative strengths and weaknesses among
proposals or to adequately explain the agency’s tradeoff decisions.287
To award the fifteen CLINs at issue in the protest, the agency had to
choose among thirty-two helicopters proposed by sixteen offerors.288
The agency plugged into a computerized “optimization model”
(“OM”) all of the relevant data, including price, payload, past
performance, experience and other data probative of the proposed
helicopters’ technical merits.289 The agency also assigned relative
weights to each of the factors included in the OM.290 The OM
provided recommended awards for each of the fifteen CLINs.291 The
technical evaluation team then validated the OM by rechecking the
inputs and outputs and determined that no changes needed to be
made.292 It forwarded the fifteen recommended line item awards to
the SSA, who also reviewed the award recommendation and
attachments which set forth the OM’s results.293 The SSA concluded
that the recommendation reflected the “best overall value to the
Government, considering that our intent was to emphasize technical
superiority (especially payload capacity) over low price.”294
The Federal Circuit upheld the awards, concluding that the agency
performed a proper trade-off analysis resulting in a reasonable award
decision.295 The court ruled that the OM outputs, including side-byside comparisons of each offer and the trade-off, by CLIN, of price
and technical merit, considered the proper variables and provided
the analysis required in source selection trade-offs.296
This decision might at first glance appear to endorse the use of a
mechanical trade-off process that bid protest decisions that the GAO
has consistently rejected.297 Croman had specifically alleged before
287. Id. at 1365.
288. Id. at 1362.
289. Id. at 1366–67.
290. Id. at 1361.
291. Id. at 1362.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id. at 1365 (internal quotation marks omitted).
295. Id. at 1365, 1367.
296. Id. at 1365.
297. See, e.g., The Clay Group, LLC, B-406647 et al., 2012 CPD ¶ 214 (Comp. Gen.
July 30, 2012) (sustaining a protest challenging an agency’s procurement of
bathroom paper products where source selection was based on mechanical
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the Court of Federal Claims that use of the OM was an impermissible
mechanical evaluation that created false precision.298 Upon closer
examination, this decision is consistent with relevant GAO and Court of
Federal Claims decisions concerning what are called “mechanical
evaluations” and which are sometimes criticized for “false precision.”299
In denying the protest, the Federal Circuit specifically
distinguished the Court of Federal Claims’s decision in Serco Inc. v.
United States,300 observing that Serco found that conclusions without
evidence of the underlying tradeoff calculations fail to comply with
FAR and deprive courts of a basis to review the award decision.301
The Serco protests sustained by the Court of Federal Claims
challenged the GSA’s reliance on a scoring method that
distinguished proposals based upon differences in points scores that
were meaningless because they took imprecise inputs and
extrapolated very precise outputs.302
In Croman, the Federal Circuit affirmed the Court of Federal
Claims’s finding that the SSA properly relied upon the detailed
evaluation data in the attachments to the award recommendation.303
In upholding the award, the court may have been motivated by the
notion that it would be counter-productive to prevent agencies from
using decision-making tools to assist with the labor and informationintensive process of analyzing complex proposals.304 At least where
an agency can articulate the considerations that were built into the
evaluation tool, where the weighting of factors is consistent with the
solicitation, and where the SSA validates the results and explains any
comparisons of point scores, without a consideration of the underlying qualitative
distinctions between quotations); Opti-Lite Optical, B-281693.2, 99-1 CPD ¶ 61
(Comp. Gen. July 15, 1999) (denying a protest challenging a contract awarded by the
U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs and acknowledging that traditional
responsibility factors can be used as evaluation factors for the award decision).
298. See Croman, 724 F.3d at 1366.
299. See, e.g., Serco Inc. v. United States, 81 Fed. Cl. 463, 465 (2008) (providing an
example of a Federal Claims decision criticizing the false precision of technical
calculations); see also sources cited supra note 297 (providing examples of GAO
decisions sustaining bid protests where source selection was based on mechanical
evaluations of point scores).
300. 81 Fed. Cl. 463 (2008).
301. See Croman, 724 F.3d at 1366 n.2 (quoting Serco, 81 Fed. Cl. at 497).
302. See Serco, 81 Fed. Cl. at 465, 489, 495 (involving many large IT service contractors
protesting the award of Alliant government-wide acquisition contracts by the GSA, which
were based solely upon falsely precise technical distinctions without any accompanying
explanation and did not take into account the differences in pricing).
303. See Croman, 724 F.3d at 1365 (noting that the SSA reviewed the award
recommendation attachments and that these attachments demonstrated that a
proper tradeoff analysis was conducted).
304. See id. at 1361 (explaining that the OM was developed to review and evaluate
more efficiently what previously had required the contracting officer significant time
and effort to conduct manually).
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trade-offs, it only makes sense to rely upon software to accelerate the
analysis, minimize errors, and illustrate tradeoff alternatives.305
III. CLAIMS
The difficulty in predicting the outcomes of the cases we have
categorized as “claims” cases stems from the substantive uncertainty and
the unusual circumstances from which they arose. The issues addressed
by the Federal Circuit in these cases ranged from the tangible and
salient—the reasonableness of costs incurred in feeding a rapidly
increasing number of troops in a dynamic war zone—to the intangible
and subtle—whether certain actuarial assumptions regarding pension
fund accruals comply with the Cost Accounting Standards.306
A. Kellogg Brown & Root Services, Inc. v. United States
The Federal Circuit in Kellogg Brown & Root Services, Inc. v. United
States307 primarily examined the reasonableness of costs under a cost
reimbursement contract.308 The court largely upheld the legal and
factual findings of the Court of Federal Claims.309 In doing so, the
Federal Circuit created important jurisprudence in denying certain costs
as unreasonable and by limiting the reach of the False Claims Act.
In 2009, Kellogg Brown & Root Services, Inc. (“KBR”) filed a claim
in the Court of Federal Claims, seeking approximately $41 million in
unpaid costs related to its dining facility at Camp Anaconda in Iraq.310
In response, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) filed
counterclaims alleging that KBR managers had violated the AntiKickback Act and had defrauded the government by accepting
kickbacks from a subcontractor.311 These violations, argued the DOJ,
caused KBR to forfeit any claims it had against the United States and
required that it reimburse the government monies paid on the
305. See id. (pointing out that the OM’s objective of determining an overall best
value for the government for each line and item and doing so efficiently).
306. See infra Part III.A. (discussing Kellogg Brown & Root Servs., Inc. v. United
States, 728 F.3d 1348, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2013), a case regarding costs related to a
dining facility for troops at Camp Anaconda in Iraq); infra Part III.B. (discussing
Gen. Dynamics Corp. v. Panetta, 714 F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2013), a case regarding
compliance with Cost Accounting Standards when the company used partial-year
valuation in computing its retirement plan forward pricing rates).
307. 728 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2013), corrected on denial of reh’g en banc, Nos. 20125106, 2012-5115, 2014 WL 1284763 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 28, 2014) (per curiam).
308. Id. at 1352.
309. Id. at 1372.
310. Id. at 1352.
311. Id. at 1364–65 (referring to prohibitions of the Anti-Kickback Act, 41 U.S.C.
§§ 51–58 (2012)).
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tainted contract.312 After a ten-day bench trial, the Court of Federal
Claims awarded KBR $11,792,505.31 plus interest in reasonable
reimbursable costs and expenses under FAR 31.201-3.313 The court
also awarded the government $38,000 on its Anti-Kickback Act
counterclaim but denied its fraud claims, including an assertion
under the False Claims Act.314 On cross-appeals, KBR argued that the
Court of Federal Claims had incorrectly assessed cost reasonableness
and erroneously calculated its base fee.315
For its part, the
government claimed that the Court of Federal Claims had improperly
dismissed its False Claims Act allegation and had improperly limited
the Anti-Kickback Act penalties.316 Although the Federal Circuit
rejected many of the parties’ claims, it reversed and remanded for
recalculations of KBR’s base costs and Anti-Kickback Act penalties.317
1.

The history of the LOGCAP III contract and related subcontracts
In late 2001, the government awarded the Army Logistics Civil
Augmentation Program Contract (“LOGCAP III”) in support of
Operation Iraqi Freedom.318 Under the LOGCAP III Indefinite
Delivery, Indefinite Quantity (“IDIQ”) contract KBR was to
perform logistics support services in Kuwait and Iraq on a costplus-award-fee basis.319
Once the aerial offensive in Iraq began in March 2003, and the
number of ground troops swelled, the Army expanded dining facility
services to fifty sites in Iraq, including Camp Anaconda, just north of
Baghdad.320 In June 2003, KBR offered prequalified subcontractors a
master agreement under which KBR could expedite performance
through work releases.321 Based largely on recommendations from
KBR’s Regional Food Service Manager for Iraq, Terry Hall, and his
Deputy, Luther Holmes, Tamimi Global Company, Ltd. (“Tamimi”)
received a master agreement.322 By the time of this award, however,
Hall and Holmes had begun accepting kickbacks from Tamimi Vice
President Shabbir Khan.323 In April 2003, Hall and Holmes each
312. Id. at 1365–66.
313. Id. at 1358.
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. Id. at 1367, 1369.
317. Id. at 1372.
318. Id. at 1353.
319. Id.
320. Kellogg Brown & Root Servs., Inc. v. United States (Kellogg II), 103 Fed. Cl.
714, 749 (2012), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 728 F.3d 1348.
321. Id. at 718–19.
322. Kellogg, 728 F.3d at 1353–54.
323. Id. at 1353.
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received $5,000 from Khan.324 The kickbacks continued through
January 2004 and eventually totaled approximately $38,000.325
On July 22, 2003, the Army required KBR to provide dining
facility services in four separate structures at Camp Anaconda for
18,700 personnel.326 KBR selected Tamimi for this work and
decided to pay the subcontractor based on the actual headcount of
troops served or the projected headcount provided by the Army,
whichever was greater.327
On September 4, 2003, the Army instructed KBR to build two new
dining facilities at Camp Anaconda.328 KBR, in turn, instructed Prime
Projects International (“PPI”) to begin construction in October 2003,
although no contract or Statement of Work was in place.329 The
Army took the position that construction was outside the scope of
LOGCAP III, so KBR could not seek reimbursement for the
construction costs under that contract.330 In response, KBR devised a
solution whereby Tamimi would subcontract the construction to PPI
and build that cost into the rates Tamimi charged KBR.331
After providing services for many months without a written
contract, on November 3, 2003, KBR issued Tamimi a material
requisition that priced six months of Tamimi’s Anaconda work at
$111,650,000.332 After numerous extensions and travails, including
internal concerns about Tamimi’s high rates, KBR sanctioned the
requisition on April 26, 2004.333
In late 2003, both the Army and the Defense Contract Audit
Agency (DCAA) began scrutinizing KBR’s cost submissions.334 The
DCAA particularly focused on Tamimi’s subcontracts, as the per
person/per day rate was unusually high.335 When KBR raised the
issue, Tamimi indicated that it would not sign a new change order or

324. See id. (explaining how Mr. Khan financed a four-day trip for Mr. Hall and
gave him $10,000, which he split evenly with Mr. Holmes).
325. Id. at 1353, 1367 n.21.
326. Kellogg II, 103 Fed. Cl. at 749.
327. Kellogg, 728 F.3d at 1354 (explaining that due to a variety of circumstances,
Tamimi began operations at Anaconda before KBR had formally approved the work
release or generated the required requisitions to pay Tamimi).
328. Id.
329. Kellogg II, 103 Fed. Cl. at 724.
330. Kellogg, 728 F.3d at 1354.
331. Kellogg II, 103 Fed. Cl. at 725.
332. Id.
333. Kellogg, 728 F.3d at 1354–55.
334. Id. at 1355.
335. See id. (noting that KBR had begun recompeting many of its Tamini contracts
to find a more competitive price).
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submit to a new pricing structure.336 In response, KBR ceased all
payments to Tamimi.337 KBR ultimately agreed to pay actual
headcount plus twelve percent on Tamimi’s unpaid invoices.338 This
resulted in an overall price reduction of $16,560,000, with $4,907,319
allocated to Anaconda.339 On August 12, 2004, KBR extended
Tamimi’s performance period, lowered the rates, and implemented
the negotiated price reduction.340 Nonetheless, KBR decided to
withhold payment on outstanding invoices because of lingering
questions about Tamimi’s rates.341
Meanwhile, KBR attempted to recompete the work at Anaconda.342
On July 15, 2004, KBR issued an RFP to which Tamimi and two other
KBR awarded the work to a new
offerors responded.343
subcontractor, who proved unable to perform, and KBR was forced to
extend Tamimi’s contract to November 30, 2004.344 Recognizing
KBR’s inability to secure a capable replacement subcontractor,
Tamimi insisted on a long-term extension.345 Eventually, the parties
agreed to extend Tamimi’s performance by a year and effected
additional discounts of $22,721,827.346
During those negotiations, the government continued to
investigate the dining facility charges at Anaconda and other sites.347
In March 2005, the Army and KBR settled the “actual headcount vs.
projected headcount” issue.348 This settlement was modified on
several occasions, and the government ultimately determined that

336. Kellogg II, 103 Fed. Cl. at 730.
337. Id.
338. Id. at 731.
339. Id. at 731–32.
340. Id. at 732.
341. Kellogg Brown & Root Servs., Inc. v. United States, 728 F.3d 1348, 1355 (Fed.
Cir. 2013), corrected on denial of reh’g en banc, Nos. 2012-5106, 2012-5115, 2014 WL
1284763 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 28, 2014) (per curiam).
342. Id.
343. Kellogg II, 103 Fed. Cl. at 734. Tamimi first attempted to contract directly
with the Army to provide dining facility services at Anaconda, offering a lower rate
than KBR and noting that it owned all of dining facility buildings and controlled all
of the personnel who worked there. Id. The Army rejected the offer and chastised
Tamimi for illegally soliciting a direct contract with the Army while working under
LOGCAP III. Id.
344. Id.
345. Id. at 735.
346. See id. at 735, 741 (calculating the total amount of discounts Tamimi
conceded and the additional discount provided by the year extension).
347. Kellogg, 728 F.3d at 1356–57.
348. See id. at 1357 (describing the disagreement over whether the contracts
require KBR to be prepared to serve the number of troops based on a projected
headcount or based on the actual number of troops present as the “boots-throughthe-door controversy”).

GOVK.OFF.TO.WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE)

1350

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

6/23/2014 2:31 PM

[Vol. 63:1307

KBR had unreasonably overcharged in the amount of $41.1 million
in costs and fee.349
2.

KBR’s suit and the government’s counter-suit
KBR sued the Army for the nearly $41.1 million in costs and markups that the Army had withheld.350 The government countersued,
seeking forfeiture of KBR’s claims under the False Claims Act,
penalties under the Anti-Kickback Act, and other damages—all
premised on Hall and Holmes’s receipt of kickbacks from Tamimi.351
Following a ten-day trial, the Court of Federal Claims first
addressed the reasonableness of KBR’s claimed subcontractor (i.e.,
Tamimi) costs under FAR 52.216-7.352 First, the court considered
KBR’s position that because the negotiations, which resulted in a $27
million credit to KBR, were reasonable, the result of those
negotiations too must be reasonable.353 The court rejected KBR’s
major premise that the negotiations were conducted reasonably354
and thus found that KBR’s reliance on the process to inform the
reasonableness of the outcome was misplaced.355
Second, the court was not persuaded by KBR’s reliance on the
“headcount” settlement, which used an agreed-upon pricing model356
because, in the court’s view, the model was not designed to, and was

349. Id.
350. Kellogg, 728 F.3d at 1352; see also Kellogg Brown & Root Servs., Inc. v. United
States (Kellogg I), 99 Fed. Cl. 488, 492 (2011) (explaining that KBR filed suit to
recover over $41 million in unpaid costs from the government for services performed
at Camp Anaconda in Iraq from July to December 2004), aff’d in part, rev’d in part,
728 F.3d 1348.
351. Kellogg, 728 F.3d at 1352, 1357–58; see also Kellogg I, 99 Fed. Cl. at 439
(describing the nature of the government’s affirmative defenses and counterclaims,
which alleged that the contract with Kellogg was tainted by kickbacks involving the
subcontractor Tamimi in violation of the Anti-Kickback Act, the Special Plea in
Fraud Act, the False Claims Act, and engaged in common law fraud).
352. Kellogg II, 103 Fed. Cl. 714, 749 (2012) (describing the standard for
reasonable costs by citing to the FAR, which provides that the standard is dependent
on the particular circumstances at hand), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 728 F.3d 1348.
353. Id. at 753, 756.
354. See id. at 757–59 (detailing how the negotiator did not have a target price
during the negotiations; was not knowledgeable about the contractual situation at
Anaconda; kept very limited and partially erroneous records; accepted Tamimi’s
position that it was owed $42 million by KBR, rather than the approximately $2.5
million supported by documentation; and did not know that KBR was withholding
funds due to Tamimi).
355. Id.
356. See id. at 724 (explaining that under the agreed pricing model in question,
KBR agreed to pay the subcontractor a price that would be based upon either an
“actual headcount of troops” at the base in question, or a “projected headcount
provided by the Army, whichever was greater”).
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not capable of, accurately assessing the price reasonableness of any
individual site.357
Last, the court rejected KBR’s argument that its proposed analysis
should be used instead of the DCAA’s audit findings.358 Although the
court agreed that the DCAA’s audit failed to take into account certain
factors that made Camp Anaconda a unique dining facility challenge,
it was not persuaded by KBR’s proffered alternative analysis.359
The court found, however, that KBR had justified the
reasonableness of some of the prices at Anaconda that were
challenged by the government.360 Noting that some disputed
charges were less than those proposed by would-be subcontractors
in response to a July 2004 RFP, and determining that these
competitive bids were probative of the reasonableness of KBR’s
prices, the court concluded that KBR was entitled to an additional
$11,460,940.31 plus fees.361
As to the government’s Anti-Kickback Act362 counterclaim, the
court held that the government was entitled to reimbursement, but
not to civil penalties.363 The court opined that the government could
recover civil penalties from an employer under the doctrine of
respondeat superior, but found that there was not sufficient evidence
that KBR management had knowledge of Hall and Holmes’s kickback

357. See id. at 742–43 (describing the “parametric [statistical] model” used by KBR
to estimate the agreed pricing cost as one that failed to produce reliable data for
individual sites, like Anaconda Camp).
358. Id. at 768.
359. See id. (clarifying that the fact that the DCAA had “difficulties controlling the
internal compass of its own [audit] process” did not amount to a finding that KBR’s
costs were themselves reasonable and did not warrant relieving the contractor of the
burden to demonstrate the reasonableness of its proffered costs).
360. See id. at 768–71 (exercising its discretion to rely on “any evidence
demonstrating price reasonableness that was presented at trial” and proceeding to
determine that KBR charged a reasonable price for services provided at the camp in
December 2004).
361. Id. at 770–71.
362. The Anti-Kickback Act contains two civil remedy provisions:
(1) The United States may, in a civil action, recover a civil penalty from any
person who knowingly engages in conduct prohibited by section 53 of this
title . . . [and;] (2) [t]he United States may, in a civil action, recover a civil
penalty from any person whose employee, subcontractor or subcontractor
employee violates section 53 of this title by providing, accepting, or charging
a kickback.
41 U.S.C. § 55(a) (2012).
363. See Kellogg II, 103 Fed. Cl. at 773 (ruling that it would be inappropriate to
hold KBR liable under a vicarious liability theory because of lack of evidence on the
record that Messers. Hall and Holmes’s superior, Mr. Gatlin, had “direct knowledge
of—and thus acquiesced in—” their improper conduct).
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activity.364 It therefore only held KBR strictly liable for the $38,000
proven value of the kickbacks under 41 U.S.C. § 55(a)(2).365
The court had earlier granted KBR’s motion to dismiss the
government’s False Claims Act Claim.366 The court observed that the
government had not alleged KBR submitted inflated costs as a result of
the kickbacks.367 Because the government could not tie the kickbacks to
anything about KBR’s reimbursement vouchers, the government failed
to meet a necessary element of a False Claims Act claim.368
3.

The Federal Circuit’s decision
On appeal, asserting entitlement to the full $41.1 million withheld,
KBR argued that the lower court committed legal error by applying
the incorrect standard of review to the reasonableness-of-costs
inquiry.369 KBR stated that the court should have awarded all fees
absent a showing of “gross misconduct,” “arbitrary action,” or “clear
abuse of discretion.”370 Finding no support for KBR’s suggested
standard in the text of FAR 31.201-3 or court precedent, the Federal
Circuit upheld the standard as articulated and applied by the Court
of Federal Claims.371
Applying the clear error standard to the lower court’s factual
determinations, the Federal Circuit held that the Court of Federal
Claims properly weighed the “many fact-intensive and contextspecific factors” as to KBR’s performance—including its negotiations
with subcontractors, the Army’s war-time directives, and the Global
Dining Facility Settlement—in determining which costs were
reasonable.372 The Federal Circuit also held that the lower court was
within its discretion in calculating reasonable costs, particularly in

364. Id. at 772–73. The court also held that Hall and Holmes did not possess
sufficient managerial authority for their actions to be directly imputed to KBR. Id. at
773–74.
365. Id. at 772, 776.
366. Id. at 748.
367. See Kellogg I, 99 Fed. Cl. 488, 513 (2011) (explaining that the government
alleged facts too attenuated to show that KBR submitted a false claim).
368. Id.
369. Kellogg Brown & Root Servs., Inc. v. United States, 728 F.3d 1348, 1359 (Fed.
Cir. 2013), corrected on denial of reh’g en banc, Nos. 2012-5106, 2012-5115, 2014 WL
1284763 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 28, 2014) (per curiam).
370. See id. (arguing that cost reimbursement contracts require only that
contractors give their “best efforts” in performing the contract).
371. Id. at 1360, 1372.
372. See id. at 1360–64 (reviewing the trial court’s factual determinations,
including its assessment of KBR’s negotiations with Tamimi and its evaluation of
Army’s directives to KBR under a clear error standard).
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light of KBR’s burden of proving the reasonableness of its costs
pursuant to FAR 31.201-3(a).373
KBR succeeded in challenging the calculation of its base fee.374
The Court of Federal Claims calculated KBR’s fees as one percent of
its reasonable costs.375 The contract, however, required a payment of
one percent of all fee-bearing costs, not just reasonable costs.376 The
Federal Circuit therefore reversed and remanded with instructions to
recalculate the proper base fee.377
The government challenged, unsuccessfully, the lower court’s
findings as to the False Claims Act378 and other fraud-based
theories.379 The Federal Circuit reversed only the Court of Federal
Claims’s findings with respect to Anti-Kickback Act penalties.380
The Federal Circuit found that the lower court correctly dismissed
the False Claims Act counterclaim.381 To prevail under the False
Claims Act, the Federal Circuit noted, the government was required
to show that KBR had knowingly submitted a false or fraudulent
claim for payment and that the United States suffered damage as a
result.382 Although the government argued that KBR’s invoices were
tainted by the kickbacks received by Hall and Holmes, the court held
that the government failed to properly plead that the invoices
submitted by KBR were inflated by the kickbacks and were therefore
false or fraudulent, or that KBR had knowledge of any inflation due
to kickbacks.383 This failure in pleading, said the court, required
dismissal of the False Claims Act counterclaim.384
The Federal Circuit reversed the lower court’s findings as to the
Anti-Kickback Act, holding that the proper test is not the position of
the bad actors within the corporate hierarchy, but whether they were

373. Id. at 1359.
374. Id. at 1364.
375. Id. The Court of Federal Claims awarded the one percent base fee as
reasonable, which amounted to $11,460,940.31. Id.
376. Id.
377. Id.
378. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733 (2012).
379. Kellogg, 728 F.3d at 1365, 1367, 1371 (upholding the trial court’s dismissal of
the government’s challenges to claims under the Special Plea in Fraud, the False
Claims Act, and common law-fraud claims).
380. Id. at 1370.
381. Id. at 1367.
382. Id.
383. See id. (noting that the government only makes the argument that the
invoices “were false or fraudulent because the subcontract itself was tainted by
kickbacks”).
384. Id.
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acting within the scope of their employment.385 Because evidence
showed Hall and Holmes were acting within the scope of their
employment, the court found that KBR should be held vicariously
liable under § 55(a)(1).386 It therefore reversed and remanded with
instructions to recalculate damages under the Anti-Kickback Act.387
Both parties sought a panel rehearing and a rehearing en banc.
After briefing, the requests were denied.388
4.

Importance of the case
In upholding the rejection of KBR’s claimed costs as unreasonable,
this case set an important precedent that financial decisions made by
contractors, even in meeting warzone exigencies, may be secondguessed by the agency and invalidated by the courts. KBR unsuccessfully
argued that the government has traditionally assumed all risk in costreimbursement contracting, absent gross misconduct by the
contractor.389 But in rejecting this theory, and by applying its own
assessment of the reasonableness of costs incurred, the court
dramatically shifted the risk to the contractor who, despite having
incurred costs, may not recover these costs if the prices are later deemed
“unreasonable.”390 The impact of this decision cannot yet be known, but
it is likely going to chill contractors’ enthusiasm for entering into costreimbursement contracts under exigent circumstances.

385. Id. at 1369. The court also held that the Anti-Kickback Act is outside the
scope of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 217 (1957), which limits vicarious
liability for the purposes of punitive damages. Kellogg, 728 F.3d at 1370.
386. See Kellogg, 728 F.3d at 1369–70 (recalling that as a general rule and absent
special circumstances, the knowledge of employees or agents is to be imputed to
their corporations or principals).
387. Id. at 1370. Judge Newman dissented to the Anti-Kickback portion of the
decision on the grounds that no evidence was presented the KBR knew of or
benefited from the kickbacks. See id. at 1372–73 (Newman, J., dissenting).
388. The panel granted in part the government’s petition for rehearing but only
for the limited purpose of deleting the words “at the Court of Federal Claims” from
its opinion. Kellogg Brown & Root Servs, Inc. v. United States, Nos. 2012-5106, 20125115, 2014 WL 1284763, at *1 (Fed Cir. Mar. 28, 2014) (en banc) (per curiam). The
petition was denied in all other respects. Id.
389. Kellogg, 728 F.3d at 1359. Two contractor trade groups, the National Defense
Industrial Association and the Professional Services Council, filed an amicus brief
before the Federal Circuit arguing that KBR should have received the full $41.1
million in costs. They contended that the FAR does not permit the type of risk
shifting undertaken by the court, and that doing so would undermine a contractor’s
desire to undertake risky cost reimbursement projects. See Brief of Amici Curiae
Professional Services Council & National Defense Industrial Asssociation in Support
of Kellog Brown & Root Services, Inc. at 11–12, Kellogg, 728 F.3d 1348 (No. 12-5106),
2013 WL 144334.
390. Kellogg, 728 F.3d at 1352, 1359.
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The second significant result of this decision is that the court
denied the government’s attempt to bootstrap violations of the AntiKickback Act into violations of the False Claims Act.391 In recent
years, the government has aggressively sought to comingle the False
Claims Act and Anti-Kickback statutes, including the pursuit of novel
theories of liability based on contractor certifications.392 Here,
although the government tried to assert a per se False Claims Act
violation based on the kickbacks received by Hall and Holmes, the
court stated that it would examine the pleading requirements of the
statutes separately and found that, because there was no argument
that KBR’s invoices were actually inflated due to the kickbacks, the
submitted claims (including the certification that KBR was in
compliance with applicable laws) were not “false.”393 This scrutiny by
the Federal Circuit of the actual content of False Claims Act
allegations may be cold comfort to contractors, as the government is
forewarned to better plead its False Claims Act allegations.
B. General Dynamics Corp. v. Panetta
In General Dynamics Corporation v. Panetta,394 the Federal Circuit
upheld a decision of ASBCA denying an appeal by General Dynamics
Corporation (“General Dynamics”). At issue was the contracting
officer’s final determination that General Dynamics failed to comply
with Cost Accounting Standard (“CAS”) 412 when the company used
partial-year asset valuation in computing its retirement plan forward
pricing rates.395

391. See id. at 1365 (reviewing and addressing the government’s claims under the
False Claims Act and the Anti-Kickback Act separately because “liability under one
statute does not automatically trigger liability under the other[]”).
392. This aggressive stance is most often seen in the healthcare context, and has
been integrated into recent legislation. For example, the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act (signed into law in March 2010) provides that a claim resulting
from a violation of the healthcare anti-kickback statute is per se a violation of the
False Claims Act. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1320a7b(g) (2012); see also United States ex rel. McNutt v. Haleyville Med. Supplies, 423
F.3d 1256, 1257 (11th Cir. 2005) (holding that a violation of Anti-Kickback Act can
serve as basis for a violation of False Claims Act when claims contain certification of
compliance with the law); United States v. Kellogg Brown & Root Servs., Inc., 800 F.
Supp. 2d 143, 147, 157 (D.D.C. 2011) (refusing to dismiss the government’s
complaint under the False Claims Act on the basis of the implied certification
theory); United States ex rel. Pogue v. Am. Healthcorp, 914 F. Supp. 1507, 1513 (M.D.
Tenn. 1996) (holding that because the defendants concealed their illegal activity
from the government in order to receive fraudulent Medicare payments, there was a
valid claim under the False Claims Act).
393. Kellogg, 728 F.3d at 1365, 1367.
394. 714 F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
395. Id. at 1376.
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The controversy arose out of the methodology General Dynamics
used to account for its incurred pension costs, and, accordingly, how
much of those costs could be billed to the government.396 CAS 412
provides guidance for calculating pension cost.397 In estimating
pension costs, the CAS 412 calculation calls for a number of actuarial
assumptions regarding the future conditions affecting pension cost.398
Each actuarial assumption used to measure pension costs must be
separately identified and must represent the contractor’s best
estimates of anticipated experience under the plan, considering both
past experiences and reasonable expectations of future
adjustments.399 In addition, actuarial assumptions must “reflect longterm trends so as to avoid distortions caused by short-term
fluctuations,”400 and include “mortality rate, employee turnover,
compensation levels, earning on pension plan assets, [and] changes
in values of pension plan assets.”401
Under the terms of its cost-type contracts, General Dynamics was
required to project future values of its pension funds.402 To comply with
this requirement, the company took the actual market value of the fund
and applied an assumption about the fund’s rate of future growth.403
General Dynamics and the government agreed on a yearly growth rate
of 8% for the pension fund for the period 2004 to 2008.404
General Dynamics conducted two valuations of its pension fund,
the second of which was challenged by the government as
noncompliant with CAS 412.405 First, as of January 1 of each year,
General Dynamics calculated the pension costs it was permitted to
charge to the government by determining the actual value of its
pension plan.406 Retaining the 8% yearly growth assumption, this

396. Id. at 1376–77.
397. 48 C.F.R. pt. 9903.412 (2013).
398. FAR 9904.412-30(a)(3) (2013).
399. Id. 9904.412-50(b)(2).
400. Id. 9904.412-50(b)(4).
401. Id. 9904.412-30(a)(3).
402. See Gen. Dynamics Corp. v. Panetta, 714 F.3d 1375, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2013)
(enumerating the types of contracts entered into by the company, which require
compliance with the terms of the Cost Accounting Standards); id. at 1380 (Wallach,
J., dissenting) (explaining that the company is obligated to project future values for
its pension funds, as per its agreements with the government).
403. See id. at 1377 (majority opinion).
404. Id.
405. See id. at 1377–78 (describing the company’s challenged practice of valuating
its pension fund by combining the pre-set 8% rate and an actual growth rate for the
first half of the year in question, to determine its yearly forward pricing rates).
406. Id.
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calculation compared the expected value from the prior year’s
estimation with actual value on January 1 of the new year.407
Second, under the FAR, General Dynamics calculated the
retirement plan forward pricing rate (“RPFPR”) for new contracts
and contract modifications to estimate the future value of its pension
fund.408 The RPFPR calculation involved a projection of pension plan
asset values for the current base year as well as projections between
three and nine years out.409 The parties did not dispute the Federal
Circuit’s understanding that the CAS 412 regulations govern the
RPFPR projections required by the FAR.410
For twenty-five years, General Dynamics “variably used” midyear
asset values, instead of January 1 values, in setting its updated RPFPR
proposal for a base year.411 For the period January 1 to the midyear
date, General Dynamics applied the actual growth rate of its pension;
then, from the midyear date until the end of the base year, General
Dynamics applied the 8% per year rate, pro-rated.412 The Federal
Circuit referred to this approach as use of a “blended” rate.413
General Dynamics then applied the long-term 8% rate for the
remaining years for a three to nine year projection in the RPFPR.414
While the government and General Dynamics agreed that the
appropriate assumed growth rate was 8% per annum, they did not
agree on the value against which the 8% growth rate would be
applied.415 The government argued that the 8% rate must be applied
to the value of the fund on January 1 of the year in which General
Dynamics made the projection.416 General Dynamics argued that
rather than being required to ignore variations in the market
between January 1 and the time of valuation under the CAS, it could
appropriately use the most current value of the pension fund.417
In 2006, the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA)
notified General Dynamics that the company’s use of a “blended
407. Id.
408. See id. (quoting FAR 42.1701(b), which states the contracting officer must
require the contractor’s forward pricing rate proposal to be based on accurate, up-todate, and complete data).
409. Id.
410. Id.
411. Id.
412. Id.
413. Id.
414. Id.
415. See id. at 1377–78 (observing that the Defense Contract Management Agency
notified General Dynamics that its use of the blended rate failed to comply with the CAS
and proceeded to issue two notices of non-compliance with the CAS on this basis).
416. Id. at 1378–79.
417. Id. at 1378.

GOVK.OFF.TO.WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE)

1358

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

6/23/2014 2:31 PM

[Vol. 63:1307

rate” did not comply with CAS 412.418 In 2007, the Contracting
Officer issued a final notice of noncompliance with CAS 412,
prompting General Dynamics to submit a compliant retirement plan
using the 8% rate from January 1.419 In 2008, however, General
Dynamics again submitted a retirement plan using the blended rate
for the base year, after which the contracting officer issued a second
final determination of noncompliance with CAS 412.420 This time,
General Dynamics appealed to the ASBCA.421
The ASBCA denied General Dynamics’s appeal, finding the
company’s substitution of a midyear value and a blended rate in place
of the 8% long-term estimate rate constituted “actuarial assumptions”
because they were “estimate[s] of future conditions affecting pension
cost” as defined in CAS 412-30(a)(3).422 The actuarial assumptions
were, in turn, encompassed by the prohibitions of CAS 41250(b)(4).423 The ASBCA further observed that General Dynamics’s
use of partial-year asset data reflected short-term fluctuations that
introduced distortion prohibited by CAS 412-50(b)(4).424
General Dynamics argued on appeal that the ASBCA erred as a
matter of law when it determined that the company violated CAS 41250(b)(4) by using the partial-year asset valuation and the subsequent
blended rate in making its RPFPR.425 General Dynamics offered the
following arguments in favor of its position. First, it noted that it had
been using this method for twenty-five years without government
objection, presumably making an estoppel argument that the court’s
opinion did not specifically address.426 The company next contended
that its use of a current, midyear value was not an estimate of future
conditions; it was, instead, “a historical fact.”427 Last, General
Dynamics maintained that because the midyear value and the
resulting blended rate were not actuarial assumptions under CAS
412-30(a)(3), the company’s use of these values could not violate CAS
412-50(b)(4), which only applies to actuarial assumptions.428
418. Id. at 1377.
419. Id.
420. Id.
421. Id. at 1378.
422. Gen. Dynamics Corp., ASBCA No. 56744, 11-2 BCA ¶ 34,787.
423. See id. at 18–19 (ruling that General Dynamics’s methodology reflected the types
of short-term fluctuations and distortions that the CAS specifically intended to avoid).
424. Id.
425. Gen. Dynamics, 714 F.3d at 1378.
426. Id.
427. Id.
428. See id. (elaborating on General Dynamics’s reasoning that forcing contractors
to use the government’s less accurate accounting method led to conflicting
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The government offered three principal responses to General
Dynamics’s arguments. First, the government argued that General
Dynamics’s use of midyear market value of its pension plan and the
subsequent blended rate are both “actuarial assumptions” under CAS
412-30(a)(3).429
The government next noted that the actuarial
assumptions (relying on midyear values) necessarily reflected short-term
fluctuations and caused distortions in violation of CAS 412-50(b)(4).430
Lastly, the government maintained that “the relative accuracy” of
General Dynamics’s method was “irrelevant,” because the purpose of the
CAS regulations “is uniformity and consistency, not accuracy.”431
Notably, the government did not offer any evidence that General
Dynamics’s approach caused actual harm to the government.
1.

The Federal Circuit’s decision
Laying foundation for its ruling, the majority began by explaining
that the CAS seek to create uniformity in how contractors calculate
and assign costs to government contracts.432 Quoting CAS 412-20(a),
the majority explained that the purpose of the CAS is to “enhance
uniformity and consistency.”433 The fact that General Dynamics’s
methodology is more accurate was deemed irrelevant where it “does
not promote such uniformity and consistency.”434 The court then
stated that “uniformity and consistency are clearly missing in General
Dynamics’s methodology” and that “[t]he practice espoused by
General Dynamics is thus contrary to uniformity and consistency” and
that the company’s “random or arbitrary sampling dates throughout the
year does not promote such uniformity and consistency.”435 Thus,
pursuant to the reasoning below, the majority found that General
Dynamics’s use of midyear market values and the subsequent blended
rate for the base year violated CAS 412-50(b)(4).436
The majority found first that both the midyear market value and
the subsequent blended rate are actuarial assumptions.437 The court
observed that the parties agreed the assumed 8% return from January
obligations with FAR, CAS, and Truth in Negotiations Act (TINA) provisions
requiring contractors to produce accurate estimates).
429. Id. at 1378–79.
430. Id. at 1379.
431. Id.
432. Id. at 1376 (citing Gates v. Raytheon Co., 584 F.3d 1062, 1064 (Fed. Cir. 2009)).
433. Id. at 1379.
434. Id. at 1379–80.
435. See id. at 1380 (emphasis added) (observing that General Dynamics has used
valuation dates from January, June, July, August, and October, varying both the
month and dates within each month).
436. Id. at 1379.
437. Id.
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1 was an actuarial assumption regardless of the actual value of the
assets on January 1; thus, both the date chosen and the rate applied
were actuarial assumptions.438 Likewise, the decision to use a day other
than January 1 and then “blending” that value with a pro-rated 8%
growth rate was an actuarial assumption because it effectively substituted
a new rate and base date in place of the original 8% growth rate from
January 1.439 In other words, the new blended rate from the midyear
date was as much “an estimate of future conditions affecting pension
cost” as the original 8% rate from January 1.440 Thus, both the choice of
a specific midyear date and the resulting blended rate were actuarial
assumptions governed by CAS 412-50(b)(4).
The majority next found that General Dynamics’s use of the
midyear value and the resulting blended rate violated CAS 41250(b)(4) because it did not effectively reflect long-term trends and
avoid short-term fluctuations as called for by CAS 412-50(b)(4).441
The majority observed that the use of a midyear value is necessarily
indicative of short-term changes because the value is only based on
the short-term trend from January 1 to that midyear point.442
In concluding that the methodology utilized by General Dynamics
ran counter to the CAS, the court reasoned that “the presumed
accuracy of the midyear value in the base year does not make the use
of that value and the subsequent blended rate compliant with
CAS.”443 The court observed that the FAR does not mention
accuracy, short- or long-term, as General Dynamics’s approach
offers.444 Further, even if General Dynamics’s approach was an
accurate representation over the short term, it was only because it
impermissibly reflected short-term fluctuations.445 Besides, the court
observed, General Dynamics’s “accuracy” argument ignored the fact
that the forward pricing rate is not only for the base year, but for a
projection from three to nine years into the future.446 While
acknowledging that the record contained no evidence that General
Dynamics self-selected a midyear date to take advantage of a short438. Id.
439. Id.
440. Id.
441. Id.
442. Id.
443. Id.
444. Id.
445. See id. (finding that General Dynamics’s method improperly locked-in the
short-term fluctuation and caused a distortion that altered the level of growth for the
remaining projection).
446. Id.
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term market change, the court expressed concern that the company’s
practice created potential for abuse, “manipulation by self-interested
selection of the pricing date.”447
In dissent, Judge Wallach opined that the court’s decision
incorrectly interpreted applicable law and contravened practical
policy considerations.448 Specifically, Judge Wallach explained that
the ASBCA’s decision rested on two invalid assumptions, either of
which, if corrected, would be sufficient to mandate reversal.449
First, the company’s use of current, intra-year data was not, in
Judge Wallach’s view, an “actuarial assumption” within the meaning
of CAS 412.450 It was, instead, the market value on that date and
applying the 8% growth rate, agreed upon by the parties, does not
transform the data to a “future condition.”451 Thus, Judge Wallach
found that CAS 412 was inapplicable to General Dynamics’s decision
to use intra-year data rather than January 1 data, because neither
actually qualified as an actuarial assumption.452 Further, Judge
Wallach observed an incongruity in the majority’s opinion where it
first agreed that “[a]s a matter of principle, . . . a value of the plan
assets on a given day is a historical fact, not an actuarial assumption,”
but then inexplicably went on to conclude that the decision to use a
day other than January 1 was an actuarial assumption because it
“effectively substitut[ed] a new rate and base date in place of the
original 8% growth rate from January.”453
Judge Wallach explained that the majority’s analysis incorrectly
assumed that calculating the projected market value for next January
1 must begin from the market value on January 1 of the current
year.454 However, the agreed upon 8% assumed growth rate does not
require a particular growth per year, but rather assumes a specific
447. See id. at 1380 (finding that the risk of manipulation was “contrary to the goals of
uniformity and consistency”). The Federal Circuit found “premature and not persuasive”
General Dynamics’s argument that using the government’s less accurate methodology
created a conflict with other CAS, FAR, and TINA provisions. Id. First, the court noted
no inconsistent obligations, leaving open the possibility of some unforeseen conflict in a
future case. Id. Second, the court opined that to the extent CAS and FAR conflict as to
the allocability of costs, the more specific CAS provisions would apply. See id. (citing
United States v. Boeing Co., 802 F.2d 1390, 1395 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (holding that CAS
regulations trump Defense Acquisition Regulations)).
448. See id. (Wallach, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority misinterpreted the
notion of actuarial assumption and incorrectly applied CAS 412 to General
Dynamics’s use of intra-year data).
449. Id.
450. Id.
451. Id. at 1381.
452. Id.
453. Id. (first two alterations in original).
454. Id.

GOVK.OFF.TO.WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE)

1362

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

6/23/2014 2:31 PM

[Vol. 63:1307

daily growth rate.”455 The 8% growth rate, therefore, could be
applied on July 1 rather than January 1.456 Judge Wallach noted that
“the precatory language of CAS 412 promoting ‘uniformity and
consistency’ is not an independent obligation,” and the government
had not carried its burden to prove that the approach employed by
General Dynamics violated of the applicable regulations.457 Judge
Wallach further reasoned that if uniformity was the government’s
primary concern, then it could have employed other requirements
such as mandating that contractors set out value estimates for
specified midyear dates.458
Second, Judge Wallach explained that even if the data that was
used could be considered an actuarial assumption, it does not
necessarily follow that it reflected short-term changes in value
trends.459 In fact, the record showed that General Dynamics’s data
led to more accurate projections.460 Judge Wallach observed that the
majority found fault with the “random” nature of the days chosen by
General Dynamics to update its retirement forward pricing rates,
where, in fact, the company’s pricing rates were updated and
resubmitted in response to events including significant changes in
benefit provisions, future workforce projections, restructuring of
workforces, or acquisitions, divestitures, plan mergers, regulatory
changes, or bidding on a major new contract.461 Judge Wallach
explained that these types of events do not occur at the same time or
with the same frequency from year to year.462
In response to the concern that General Dynamics’s methodology
could be used in the future to game the system, Judge Wallach
remarked that the concern was wholly “unsupported by the
record.”463
Because General Dynamics adjusted the “sum
compensable” by the government to market fluctuations, its

455. Id.
456. Id.
457. Id. at 1382.
458. Id. Judge Wallach agreed that the position articulated by the government
and adopted by the majority brings CAS 412 into conflict with the FAR requirement
that forward pricing rates be accurate, complete, and current at the date of
submission. Id. (quoting FAR 42.1701(b), which calls for the use of up-to-date
information to calculate the forward pricing rate).
459. Id. at 1380–81 (citing CAS 412-50(b)(4)).
460. Id. at 1382.
461. Id. at 1383; see also Gen. Dynamics Corp., ASBCA No. 56744, 11-2 BCA ¶
34,787, at 7 (listing the types of events that might have led General Dynamics to
update its rates).
462. Gen. Dynamics, 714 F.3d at 1383 (Wallach, J., dissenting).
463. Id.
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methodology did not give General Dynamics an advantage.464 Judge
Wallach found no evidence of any actual or hypothetical harm to the
Judge Wallach concluded his dissent with a
government.465
resounding policy argument, stating that the court “should not
require companies to abandon decades-long practices that are
compliant with the CAS for less accurate calculating methods
suggested by the Government.”466
2.

Importance of the case
The Federal Circuit’s decision appears to reflect the court’s view
that the purpose of CAS 412—to create uniformity in how pension
costs are allocated to the government—requires the rejection of any
method for the valuation of a company’s pension fund that may
create the potential for manipulation, even if the method is more
accurate than a compliant CAS 412 approach.
C. Haddon Housing Associates v. United States
In Haddon Housing Associates v. United States,467 the Federal Circuit
resolved cross appeals by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) and co-plaintiffs Haddon Housing Associates and
the Housing Authority of the Township of Haddon.468 In exploring the
so-called “prevention doctrine,” the Federal Circuit re-emphasized that
in order to be entitled to judicial redress contractors must complete all
of the steps of asserting the claim before the agency.
1.

Background
Haddon Housing Associates leased a housing facility for lowincome elderly residents in New Jersey’s Haddon Township, to the
Housing Authority of the Township of Haddon (collectively, we refer
to the developer/lessor and the Housing Authority as “Haddon”).469
Under the Housing Act of 1937,470 Haddon had entered into a
housing assistance payments contract (“HAP Contract”) with HUD to
provide low-income housing in that facility.471 The HAP Contract
represents the federal government’s share of the housing subsidy that

464.
465.
466.
467.
468.
469.
470.
471.

Id. at 1383–84.
Id.
Id. at 1384.
711 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
See id. at 1332–36.
Id. at 1332.
42 U.S.C. § 1437f (2012).
Haddon, 711 F.3d at 1332.
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benefits the low-income tenant.472 A key variable that determines the
HAP Contract amount is the fair market rental value of the
subsidized unit, which is subject to periodic adjustment based on
developments in the local low-income housing market, as reflected in
“comparability studies” framed by HUD and conducted by the
property manager or local housing authority.473
The submission of rent adjustment requests was a condition
precedent to obtaining HAP Contract adjustments.474 The Court of
Federal Claims held that, in connection with the rent adjustments for
the years 2001 and 2003, “Haddon was excused from performance of
the condition precedent [pursuant to] the ‘prevention doctrine.’”475
Under the prevention doctrine, the court held that Haddon’s failure to
submit rent adjustment requests in 2001 and 2003 was a direct result of
HUD’s previous denials.476 Finding that the government materially
contributed to Haddon’s failure to fulfill the condition precedent, the
lower court concluded that Haddon was excused from performance.477
Comparatively, the court found that government denials did not cause
Haddon’s failure to submit adjustments in 2002.478
2.

The prevention doctrine does not apply
On appeal, the Federal Circuit noted that under the prevention
doctrine, the non-occurrence of a condition precedent by Party A is a
defense for Party B in a breach action.479 The doctrine is based on
the principle that a contracting party has an inherent duty to refrain
from blocking its counterparty’s performance.480 Thus, failing to
fulfill the condition precedent is excused when the other party
hinders or prevents the party from doing so.481
Observing no error in the lower court’s factual findings, the
Federal Circuit nevertheless concluded that the facts did not justify
application of the prevention doctrine to excuse Haddon’s failure to
472. Id. at 1332–33.
473. Id. at 1333.
474. Id. at 1335 (referencing the lower court’s fact finding in Haddon Hous.
Assocs. v. United States, 99 Fed. Cl. 311 (2011)).
475. Id.
476. Id.
477. Id.
478. Id.
479. Id. at 1338 (observing that the prevention doctrine has long been applied by
the Federal Circuit’s “sister circuits with relative consistency”).
480. Id.
481. Id. (referencing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 245 (1981); 13
SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 39:4
(4th ed. 1993 & Supp. 2012)).
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make rent adjustment requests in 2001 and 2003.482 That is, while
HUD’s denials of prior rent adjustment requests and other agency
actions may have discouraged Haddon, HUD’s actions did not excuse
Haddon’s failure to make the adjustment requests required under
the HAP Contract.483 The Federal Circuit observed that trial
testimony showed Haddon’s frustration with HUD’s insistence on
comparability studies, but noted that HUD did nothing to prevent
Haddon from submitting the requests.484 As a result, Haddon was not
entitled to the adjustment in a lawsuit that it did not first request
from the agency.485
In dicta, the Federal Circuit observed that the partial breach action
Haddon elected to bring held important implications for its suit.486
If, instead, Haddon had pursued a claim for anticipatory repudiation,
it could have treated HUD’s actions as a total breach, terminated the
contract, and filed suit.487
Under those circumstances, the
government would have been relieved of any continuing duty to
perform according to the contract.488 But, because Haddon elected
to pursue a claim for partial breach and the government continued
performing, Haddon could not refuse to perform its obligations
under the contract.489 If accepted, Haddon’s argument—that it could
recover in the lawsuit rent adjustments it never requested from HUD—
would create a situation where Haddon would gain the benefit of the
government’s continued performance while Haddon was exempted
from performing on the contract.490 Having rejected Haddon’s
reliance on the prevention doctrine, the Federal Circuit denied
Haddon’s claim for HAP Contract adjustments for 2001 and 2003.491
The Haddon decision applies the familiar ripeness-of-claims
principle to the merits of a contract breach action. Just as claimants
in many circumstances must exhaust administrative remedies before
filing in court,492 so, too, must contractor claimants under the
482. Id.
483. Id. (holding that while the previous denials may have discouraged Haddon
from making requests, HUD did not “impede” Haddon from doing so).
484. Id. at 1339.
485. Id. at 1340.
486. Id. at 1339.
487. Id. (referencing 13 WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 481, § 39:32).
488. Id.
489. Id. (referencing Haddon Hous. Assocs. v. United States, 99 Fed. Cl. 311, 334
n.35 (2011), in which that court cited 13 WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 481,
§ 39:32)).
490. Id. at 1340.
491. Id.
492. See, e.g., Estate of Hage v. United States, 687 F.3d 1281, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
(holding that ranchers with permits to graze livestock on federal land who claim
compensation for improvements must first seek valuation of improvements from the
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Contract Disputes Act.493 Unless truly prevented by its government
counterpart, a contractor claimant must satisfy all of its contractual
prerequisites to be entitled to relief.
IV. CONTRACT AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
Perhaps no legal dispute better exemplifies the uncertainty that
exists at the outset of litigation than when both parties read the
same words of a statute or contract and arrive at irreconcilable
conclusions about what those words mean. When Rockies Express,
a government contracting novice, entered into a multi-billion
dollar agreement with the U.S. Department of Interior
(“Interior”), it did not believe Interior could simply walk away for
its own convenience, opportunistically citing as the basis the
agency’s own drafting omissions.494 The Federal Circuit agreed.495
When TKC Aerospace leased a corporate jet to the Department of
Homeland Security at a discount due to the Coast Guard taking
certain day-to-day maintenance responsibilities, neither party
anticipated that downtime required to repair major corrosion would
result in the loss of nine months’ worth of revenue.496 It was a toss-up
as to which of several conflicting contract provisions would determine
the outcome.497 Only Judge Reyna sided with TKC Aerospace; the
majority did not.498
Res-Care, Inc., categorized as a large business, thought that the
Workforce Investment Act’s requirement for Job Corps contracts to
be let on a “competitive basis” required unbiased consideration of all
sources and did not allow the Department of Labor to restrict
competition to small businesses.499 Thus, when the agency solicited a
Workforce Investment Act contract set aside for small business, there
was no available compromise solution to this binary problem.500 The
Federal Circuit agreed.501
agency concerned); Strategic Hous. Fin. Corp. v. United States, 608 F.3d 1317, 1332
(Fed. Cir. 2010) (establishing that a party seeking recovery of internal-revenue taxes
or penalties must first exhaust administrative remedies under IRS regulations).
493. 41 U.S.C. § 7103(a)(1) (2012); see also Bowers Inv. Co. v. United States, 695 F.3d
1380, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (noting that a final decision by a contracting officer is a
prerequisite to pursuing a claim before the Court of Federal Claims under § 7104(b)(1)).
494. Rockies Express Pipeline LLC v. Salazar, 730 F.3d 1330, 1333–35 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
495. Id. at 1342.
496. TKC Aerospace, Inc. v. Napolitano, 535 F. App’x 931, 934–35 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
497. Id. at 933–34.
498. Id. at 938–39.
499. Res-Care, Inc. v. United States, 735 F.3d 1384, 1386–87 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
500. Id. at 1386.
501. Id. at 1391.
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A. Rockies Express Pipeline LLC v. Salazar
Rockies Express Pipeline LLC v. Salzar502 arose from a Royalty-in-Kind
Precedent Agreement and two Firm Transportation Service
Agreements (“FTSAs”) between Rockies Express Pipeline LLC
(“Rockies Express”) and Mineral Management Service, a unit of the
U.S. Department of the Interior.503 In 2005, Rockies Express and
Interior contracted to build a pipeline to ship natural gas from
Wyoming to Eastern Ohio.504 Rockies Express would build the
pipeline, and Interior would pay a reservation charge for at least ten
years to reserve at least 2.5% of the gas shipped on the pipeline.505
The parties first entered into a Precedent Agreement, which bound
them to enter into FTSAs and Negotiated Rate Agreements to control
the shipping of the gas.506 The Precedent Agreement allowed
Interior to terminate only if “directed by Legislative Action or
required by a change in the Federal or State policy to discontinue
taking gas in kind . . . upon (30) thirty days written notice to [Rockies
Express].”507 More than a year after executing an FTSA for the
western section of the pipeline, Interior determined that FAR
provisions should be incorporated into the FTSA for the eastern
section.508 Unable to agree upon the terms of the Eastern FTSA,
Rockies Express terminated the Precedent Agreement on December
11, 2008, on the grounds that Interior had materially breached the
agreement.509 Nine months later, the Interior Secretary announced
the agency’s intention to end all royalty-in-kind agreements effective
October 2009.510
After an adverse contracting officer decision, Rockies Express
appealed to the Civilian Board of Contract Appeals.511 The Board
held that the Precedent Agreement was a procurement contract
subject to its jurisdiction, which the agency had breached by failing to
enter into an Eastern FTSA.512 The Board limited damages, however,
to charges through October 2009, when the contract would have

502.
503.
504.
505.
506.
507.
508.
509.
510.
511.
512.

730 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
Id. at 1333.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1333–34.
Id. at 1334 (alterations in original) (emphasis omitted).
Id.
Id. at 1334–35.
Id. at 1335.
Id.
Id.
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been terminated under Interior’s change in policy as to royalty-inkind agreements.513
On cross-appeals, the Federal Circuit affirmed jurisdiction.514 The
court noted that the CDA does not expressly define “procurement”
and applied its definition, developed in Tucker Act cases, to hold that
“procurement” means “all stages of the process of acquiring property
or services, beginning with the process of determining a need for
property or services and ending with contract completion and
closeout” to define the Board’s jurisdiction.515 Because the Precedent
Agreement was an agreement to enter into future contracts and
included the “hallmarks of a traditional contract,” such as
negotiated essential terms and conditions supported by
consideration, it was properly considered a “procurement” for
purposes of Board jurisdiction.516
On the merits, the court examined whether Interior had
breached the Precedent Agreement, and if so, the extent of
damages. Its resolution of those issues provides guidance on the
court’s approach to contract interpretation, including the effect of
the Christian doctrine on the legality of a contract, and what
constitutes a change in federal policy affecting the enforceability
of otherwise valid federal contracts.517
Regarding liability, the court found the Precedent Agreement to be
legal and enforceable.518 As an initial matter, the court summarily
rejected Interior’s contention that the contract was illegal because it
failed to include FAR provisions or a termination clause.519 In doing
so, the Federal Circuit noted that Interior did not contest liability
under the Western FTSA which itself had no FAR clauses or

513. Id.
514. Id. at 1337.
515. Id. at 1336 (citing 41 U.S.C. § 403(2) (2006)).
516. Id.
517. See id. at 1337–39 (discussing whether the Department of Interior breached
the Precedent Agreement and noting that a violation of the Christian doctrine does
not render a contract illegal); see also G.L. Christian & Assocs. v. United States, 312
F.2d 418, 423 (Ct. Cl. 1963) (holding that if the parties neglected to include a clause
in the government contract required by regulation, courts will read that clause into
the contract as a matter of law). The court in Christian applied standard language
that normally appeared in government contracts regarding the government’s ability
to terminate the contract for convenience, and held that, but for illegal conduct, the
contractor cannot recover unearned but anticipated profits, even though the
termination for convenience clause was not actually in the contract. See Christian, 312
F.2d at 423.
518. Rockies Express, 730 F.3d at 1339.
519. Id. at 1337.
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termination clause.520 The court noted Rockies Express’s lack of
experience in government contracting and held “when the issue of
legality is very close” it is just to the contractor and the government
“to uphold the award unless its invalidity is clear.”521 Moreover, in
answer to Interior’s defense that under the Christian doctrine the lack
of a termination for convenience clause voided the Precedent
Agreement, the court held that 42 U.S.C. § 15902 specifically
exempts royalty-in-kind contracts from provisions normally required
by procurement statutes, while also noting that “violation of the
Christian doctrine does not render a contract illegal; it permits the
court to cure the defect and include the clause after the fact.”522 Last,
the court found Interior’s failure to seek a FAR deviation itself a
breach of its commitments in the Precedent Agreement.523
Regarding damages, the court held that the Secretary’s announced
intention to terminate the royalty-in-kind program was not a change
in federal policy that required or entitled Interior to terminate the
Precedent Agreement and thus excuse its failure to perform.524 First,
the court noted that the Secretary’s instructions as to the termination
of the royalty-in-kind programs included a principle that all existing
contracts, such as Rockies Express’s, would be honored.525 Second,
the court read Precedent Agreement Section 3(b) as requiring that
“any policy change . . . must carry the same significance as Legislative
Action,” which requires various actions, including publication in the
Federal Register and public comment.526
Since there was no actual change in federal policy, the court found
that the Board had improperly limited damages to the period ending
October 2009 and should have instead awarded compensatory
damages through the end of the contract period.527 On this ground,
the court reversed and remanded for a finding as to compensatory
damages with the instruction that Rockies Express was entitled to
“recover its pecuniary loss of anticipated and unearned profits” for
the contract term offset by costs avoided or monies gained through
any mitigation efforts.528
520. Id. at 1338 (“To say to these appellants, ‘The joke is on you. You shouldn’t
have trusted us,’ is hardly worthy of our great government.” (quoting Brandt v.
Hickel, 427 F.2d 53, 57 (9th Cir. 1970))).
521. Id. (quoting John Reiner & Co. v. United States, 325 F.2d 438, 440 (Ct. Cl. 1963)).
522. Id. (citing Christian, 312 F.2d at 427).
523. See id. at 1338–39.
524. See id. at 1340.
525. Id.
526. Id. (citing 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1)(D)–(E) (2006)).
527. Id. at 1341.
528. Id. at 1342.
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B. TKC Aerospace, Inc. v. Napolitano
The court in TKC Aerospace, Inc. v. Napolitano529 examined specific
provisions of a contract between TKC Aerospace, Inc. (“TKCA”) and
the U.S. Coast Guard for a leased aircraft. While the majority and
dissenting opinions appear to provide little in the way of exportable
insight into the Federal Circuit’s approach to contract interpretation,
their starkly contradictory conclusions are noteworthy.
Under the contract, TKCA was responsible, through an on-site
program manager, for routine aircraft maintenance performed by
Coast Guard personnel.530 After corrosion on the aircraft caused the
aircraft to become unavailable for use, the Coast Guard withheld
approximately $500,000 in aircraft availability payments to TKCA.531
The contracting officer denied TKCA’s certified claim for payment.532
On appeal, the Civilian Board of Contract Appeals held that, under
the terms of the contract, TKCA was responsible for all maintenance,
even if Coast Guard personnel performed it.533 The Board also noted
that, while the cause of the corrosion was unknown, the Coast Guard
had followed all maintenance procedures required by contract, and
that TKCA had failed to establish that the corrosion was other than
ordinary wear and tear for which the contract assigned TKCA the risk
of loss.534 The Board further rejected TKCA’s argument that the
Coast Guard was required to give notice before withholding payments
under these circumstances.535 TKCA appealed, but the Court upheld
the Board’s decision.536
Judge Reyna’s dissent opined that the Coast Guard had taken on
the obligation to detect and prevent corrosion under the contract,
and that the contractual risk of loss provision was not limited to
“accidental” damage.537 He also would have held that substantial
evidence did not support a finding that corrosion was due to wear
and tear, and that the Coast Guard was required to alert TKCA to
downtime before damages could accrue.538

529.
530.
531.
532.
533.
534.
535.
536.
537.
538.

535 F. App’x 931 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
Id. at 933.
Id. at 934.
Id. at 935.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 935, 937–39.
Id. at 939, 941 (Reyna, J., dissenting).
Id. at 941.

GOVK.OFF.TO.WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

6/23/2014 2:31 PM

2013 GOVERNMENT CONTRACT LAW DECISIONS

1371

C. Res-Care, Inc. v. United States
In Res-Care, Inc. v. United States,539 the Federal Circuit restated its
statutory construction methodology in the context of the Workforce
Investment Act of 1998 (WIA). At issue was whether the Court of
Federal Claims erred when it found that the U.S. Department of
Labor was permitted under 29 U.S.C. § 2887(a)(2)(A) to select a
contractor to operate a Job Corps Center (JCC) program through a
set-aside for small businesses, where the WIA directs that such work
be let on a “competitive basis.”540 The Court of Federal Claims found
that the phrase “competitive basis” in § 2887(a)(2)(A) did not mean
“full and open competition,” as the large-business appellant, ResCare, argued.541 The Federal Circuit thus affirmed the lower court’s
ruling that the WIA’s “competitive basis” requirement is satisfied so
long as the “Rule of Two” is met, meaning that the agency has a
founded expectation that at least two capable small businesses will vie
for the contract.542
To interpret the statutory language in dispute, the Federal Circuit
followed a familiar formula. The court began its analysis with the
language of the statute itself.543 It reasoned that when the statutory
language is clear, the language itself controls, and the court cannot
look to regulations for guidance.544 Citing Supreme Court precedent,
the Federal Circuit emphasized that statutory language is not
determined in a vacuum but is considered in its statutory context.545
To interpret the term “competitive basis,” the Federal Circuit
presumed that it has its ordinary meaning.546 Looking to the dictionary
definitions of “competitive” and “competition,” the Federal Circuit
observed that neither definition required that a contest be open to all
potential bidders; but rather, selection criteria could be used to define a
smaller range of permitted competitors.547 The Federal Circuit noted

539. 735 F.3d 1384 (2013).
540. See Res-Care, Inc. v. United States, 107 Fed. Cl. 136, 141–42 (2012) (defining
competitive bidding as “a minimum of two potential bidders”).
541. Res-Care, Inc., 735 F.3d at 1389.
542. Id. at 1391.
543. Id. at 1387.
544. Id. (citing Info. Tech. & Applications Corp. v. United States, 316 F.3d 1312,
1320 (Fed. Cir. 2003)).
545. Id. (citing U.S. Nat’l Bank of Or. v. Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc., 508 U.S.
439, 455 (1993)).
546. Id. (observing that the WIA did not define the term “competitive basis,”
the court determined that dictionary definitions would provide guidance on its
ordinary meaning).
547. Id.
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that in certain contexts, Congress has intended for limited set-asides for
small businesses to be “competitive.”548
The Federal Circuit ultimately determined that, contrary to ResCare’s position, “competitive basis” under the WIA was not
synonymous with the requirement for “full and open competition”
found in the Competition in Contracting Act (“CICA”).549 The court
observed that Congress did not, in drafting 29 U.S.C. § 2887, borrow
CICA’s “full and open competition” terminology; § 2887 simply states
that selection of a JCC contractor shall occur “on a competitive
basis.”550 The Federal Circuit cited the “cardinal doctrine of statutory
interpretation” that presumes Congress intends different meanings
for different terms used within related statutes.551 To persuade the
court to look beyond the plain meaning of a statute, which is
controlling when unambiguous, a party must show that the legislative
history demonstrates an “extraordinary showing of contrary
intentions.”552 Here, the Federal Circuit observed that nothing in the
legislative history of the WIA supported Res-Care’s position that the
WIA was intended to prohibit the use of small business set-asides,
which is a widespread government practice, in this particular
context.553 Thus, the Federal Circuit upheld, as meeting the
requirement for a “competitive basis,” the source selection confined
to multiple small businesses bidding to operate a JCC.554
CONCLUSION
Weary reader, congratulations on making it this far. You now
understand what happened last year at what is effectively the highest
court passing judgment on government contract disputes. In this
respect, you have an advantage over the vast majority of lawyers who
practice in this area of law. We assume the number who make it from
front to back will be few but mighty—like Spartan warriors guarding
the pass at Thermopylae. Certainly Justice Holmes would be proud.

548. Id.; see also 41 U.S.C. § 152(4) (2012) (defining “competitive procedures” to
include competition limited to further Small Business Act); id. § 3303(b) (providing
that “competitive procedures” shall be used for small business set-asides).
549. Res-Care, Inc., 735 F.3d at 1389.
550. Id.
551. Id.
552. Id. (quoting Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 75 (1984), in which the
Court “caution[ed] that resort[ing] to legislative history to interpret an
unambiguous statute should only occur in ‘rare and exceptional circumstances’”).
553. Id.
554. Id. at 1388.
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We authors, always fascinated by the uncertain, eagerly await new
decisions from the Federal Circuit, which may better distinguish, for
example, procurement contracts from cooperative agreements.555
Other decisions may refine our understanding of the interplay
among various statutes and regulations enacted over the last halfcentury by various Congresses and more than a half-dozen
Presidents.556 Where there is tension and uncertainty among the vast
volumes of potentially relevant laws, regulations, and case precedents,
we will see how the Federal Circuit resolves the inevitable disputes.
Plus, new contracts are being written and breached every day. For
these reasons, we look forward to sharing our thoughts again next
year and having the benefit of yours as well.

555. See CMS Contract Mgmt. Servs. v. United States, 110 Fed. Cl. 537, 541 (2013).
In 2012, the GAO concluded that the agreements at issue are not cooperative
agreements, as HUD’s solicitation indicated, but are procurement contracts subject
to the Competition in Contracting Act. Assisted Hous. Servs. Corp., B-406738 et al.,
2012 CPD ¶236, at 14 (Comp. Gen. Aug. 15, 2012). When the agency ignored the
GAO’s recommendation, several would-be contractors challenged HUD’s action in
the Court of Federal Claims. The court reached the opposite conclusion from the
GAO. CMS Contract Mgmt. Servs., 110 Fed. Cl. at 564. As of this writing, the appeal
has been briefed and argued to the Federal Circuit, and the parties are awaiting the
final word on the solicitation.
556. See, e.g., Kingdomware Techs., Inc. v. United States, 107 Fed. Cl. 226, 230
(2012). In another case in which the GAO and the Court of Federal Claims
reached different conclusions on an issue, the court concluded that the
Department of Veterans Affairs need not determine whether certain of its
procurements should be set aside for service-disabled veteran-owned small
businesses under 38 U.S.C. § 8127(d) (2012). Kingdomware. 107 Fed. Cl. at 244;
see also Kingdomware Techs., Inc–Reconsideration, B-407232.2, 2012 CPD ¶ 351,
at *1 (Comp. Gen. Dec. 13, 2012) (announcing that in light of the Court of
Federal Claims’s resolution of the issue, the GAO will no longer entertain
protests based solely on the issue). The GAO decision marked a cease-fire in a
series of contradictory decisions between the Office and the Court of Federal
Claims. This issue, too, is now before the Federal Circuit for final resolution.

